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ABSTRACT
Privatization is a concern, in the world transition to
market economies and management of real property portfolios
(RPP) -- the building and land stock of a government.
For political and technical reasons the Government of El
Salvador's (GOES) process of privatization is unlikely to occur
in the near future, in ways that could recognize either the real
asset value or the highest and best use of the real property
held by public institutions/State Owned Enterprises (SOE's).
Literature on privatization of SOEs considers real property
in only an incidental manner. No references were found
regarding changes of use in real property held by State Owned
Enterprises (SOE's). However, changes in real property uses ,
such as leaseholds, that have not been labeled as
"privatization" have occurred for years in the public sector.
A proposed privatization with a real asset management
perspective includes: consideration of the opportunity cost of
holding real property; distortions such as free-space
subsidies; exchange-value and use-value tradeoff; and
complementarity among properties.
The GOES privatization initiatives include: a) the
elimination of fiscal drain functions; b) the divestment of real
assets to generate revenues for the budget; and c) the provision
of land to squatters.
The case studies show that, the current GOES privatization
process does not account for the opportunity cost of holding
SOEs whose space has the following characteristics: a)
underutilized subsidized, and/or surplus to the GOES's needs; b)
non-intensive-uses in prime development areas; c) potential for
a highest and best use other than the current use; and/or d)
characteristics that enhance other candidates real asset value.
The GOES privatization program decision-making process
responds to political pressures rather than technical arguments.
The three different initiatives of the program lack overall
vision and coordination. The GOES privatization takes place in
a context of widespread mismanagement of the public sector's
RPP. This document proposes: a) to complement the current
privatization evaluation with a real property asset management
perspective; b) to centralize the decision-making process of the
different privatization initiatives; and c) the improvement of
the current inventory efforts.
Thesis Supervisor: John de Monchaux.
Title: Professor of Architecture and Planning
SUBJECT AND SCOPE
Privatization is an increasingly important phenomenon in the
world transition to market economies and the reduction of the
government's role in society. Privatization that involves
publicly held buildings and land --real property-- is an
important concern in the management of the total building and
land stock of an organization --real property portfolio (RPP).
The key proposition of this thesis is that the process of
privatization by the Government of El Salvador (GOES) is for
political as well as technical reasons, unlikely to occur in the
near future, in ways that could recognize either the real asset
value or the highest and best use of the real property held by
public institutions/State Owned Enterprises (SOE's).
This work shows why privatization that includes real
property asset management practices is a better approach than
the current privatization process.
No studies have considered privatization from a real
property portfolio management standpoint according to the
Laboratory of Architecture and Planning (LAP) at M.I.T. This
thesis aims at advancing general knowledge in the field of real
property asset management. In particular it seeks to derive
lessons that can be used by other privatization processes.
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INTRODUCTION
The key proposition of this thesis is that the process of
privatization by the Government of El Salvador (GOES) is, for
political as well as technical reasons, unlikely to occur in the
near future in ways that could recognize the real asset value of
real property held by public institutions and State Owned
Enterprises (SOEs). This thesis is organized into six chapters.
Chapter One, Introduction, describes current methods of
privatization of SOEs current methods. It examines how those
methods consider real property --land and buildings -- held by
SOEs and show that real property is been considered as an
incidental element in privatization analysis. It further
examines why privatization with a real property asset management
perspective can improve the achievement of the real asset value.
Chapter Two, Theoretical Framework, analyzes the
following key issues in the analysis of the real asset value
that could improve the privatization process: the opportunity
cost of holding real property; distortions such as free-space
subsidies; the exchange-value and use-value tradeoff; and
valuation. It examines opposing views in the literature with
respect to the achievement of the real asset value.
Chapter Three, introduces the different GOES privatization
programs and the GOES's real property portfolio.
Chapter Four, examines two case studies of SOEs in light of
the framework of Chapter 2. It shows the opportunities foregone
under the current program of privatization.
Chapter Five: contains an analysis of key factors in the
GOES privatization program that preclude the current process of
privatization achieving the real asset value of the real
property held by state owned enterprises (SOE's) and public
institutions.
CHAPTER 1 PRIVATIZATION: BASIC CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES
This chapter describes the basic concepts of privatization
and the most commonly used methods of achieving it. This
chapter considers why it is important to consider an asset
management perspective in the privatization of government-held
real property.
The chapter has the following contents: first, it provides
an overview of privatization in relation to State Owned
Enterprises (SOE's); second, it examines privatization methods
and considerations; third, it presents selected implementation
aspects such as valuation; fourth, it introduces real property
as a concern in privatization of SOEs; fifth, it explores how
real estate has become a concern in the process of
privatization; and sixth, it explores the potential relation of
privatization decision-making and real asset management.
1.1 AN OVERVIEW OF PRIVATIZATION.
Changing economic conditions and the transition to market
economies have influenced governments worldwide to redefine the
role of the state in the economy, reducing fiscal and operating
deficits, reducing the size of the public sector, and developing
restructuring/adjustment strategies in order to achieve these
objectives. In this context the top agenda of governments
worldwide is privatization.
Privatization is defined as the process by which a
government, at any level, progressively transfers the ownership
and/or management control of government entities, assets,
functions, and activities to the private sector.
According to Mary Shirley of the Country Economics Department
of the World Bank, divestiture is a term that includes
privatization. Divestiture is defined as: "liquidation, both
formal and informal, whereby operations are suspended, but the
State Owned Enterprise (SOE) 1 retains a legal and economic life;
privatization of ownership through the sale of the firm as a
going concern of all or part of the firm as a going concern or
all or part of the assets; and privatization of management
through leases and management contracts." [Shirley, v]
Privatization is a notion encouraged by important
institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the USAID 2. These institutions have been
providing support and technical assistance to privatization and
divestiture efforts, and an expansion of these areas of activity
is envisaged [Vuylsteke, 2].
Privatization literature has until very recently been about
SOE's or government functions. Real property ' --land and
buildings -- has been considered as an incidental element in
privatization analysis of SOE'S. No cases have been found in
the current privatization literature, where the real property
has been the key factor, nor where the real asset value and the
achievement of the highest and best use have been taken into
account. (This notion is explored further at the end of this
chapter).
In the last few years however, the term "privatization"
emerged as a much broader concept, encompassing programs such as
cutbacks in state activities to allow room for private
initiatives; or the general reassignment of property rights from
the state to the individual (as in Chinese agriculture or in
Mexico where 28,000 farms in the form of ejidos 4 which occupy
1 million square kilometers -- half of Mexico's total land area--
will be allowed to be privately owned by either the current
farmers or potential investors [Economist, Nov 16th-22 1991:
49]. In the last few years it has meant giving land to squatters
in Peru or El Salvador. A new approach to privatization
resulted from the decision to privatize publicly held real
estate in such countries as Russia and Hungary.
World Bank studies show that divestiture is a rising
concern in the programs of structural adjustment in developing
countries, for a number of reasons: [Shirley: 1987, 2-3].
a. The upsurge in interest in divestiture in the
developed world, most notably in Britain, Italy, and France.
b. The sense that the state has become too large.
divestiture reduces the burden of SOE's.
c. The hope that divestiture will lead to more
imaginative and efficient use of resources.
d. The expectation of divestiture as a force for
efficiency because financial transactions between government and
private firms are expected to be more transparent.
e. The democratization of the national assets, Chile
privatization program, for example, aims at increasing
participation, partly to raise the public's awareness of and
pressure for SOEs' efficiency.
f. The interest in raising revenues, for example
privatization in Thailand, has been justified in public
discussion by the argument of raising substantial revenues.
g. Privatization as a way to reduce fiscal pressures by
getting rid of unprofitable SOE's through liquidation and sales
1.2 PRIVATIZATION METHODS
The main techniques and key characteristics are
described by Vuyskele 5 in Table 1. T h e c h o i c e of
privatization techniques is generally a function of the
government's objectives, the condition of the SOE, and its
sector of activity, and the country's characteristics.
[Vuyskele,3] Experience reveals that carefully modelled
practical approaches can come close to satisfying both stated
objectives and various types of constraints. Several
combinations of the above may exist as well. Some governments
(France, UK and Chile) have carried out a substantial number of
privatizations using a broad mix of techniques. Some of these
methods can bring about total divestiture or can be implemented
partially or gradually. One must be careful however when
choosing particular techniques, since they depend upon various
factors, such as those described in section 1.22.
Methods
Public offering Distribution to the general publie
of shares. of all or part of shares in public
limited company (as a going concern).
Procedures
If SOE is in required condition, standard
processing of public offering on the basis
of prospectus. If not in required form or
or condition, then readying process neces-
sary. Offer can be on fixed price or ten-
der basis.
Private sale Sale of all or part of government SaLe may result from negotiation or competi-
of shares. shareholding in a stock corporation tive biddin process. May be done Id bj or
(as a going concern) to a single entity may be subject to mandatory country proce-
or group. Can take various forms such dures or guidelines on valuation. prequali-
as a direct acquisition by another cor- fication. evaluation of proposals. terms of
porate entity or a private placement payment, ate. In som ases, prior restruc-
targeting institutional investors. Can turing asoessary. Involves investor search.
be full or partial privatisation (L.e..
transformation into Joint venture).
SaLs of S&Ls of assets (instead of shares). Alternatives: s&ls of assets by governmento
government Private saie, disposal of ome assets by be91 dissolution
or enterprise of 50 and sale of all assets other. Pro-
assets. cedures for private sale of hares pener-
ally apply.
ragmentation. teorgaisation of a 509 into several Deponds on structure of p,.
entities (or one holding company and
severalu subsidiaries.) Each entity
ill be then be privatised seporately.
ov private Primary share issue subscribed by the Public offering of private issue of new
investment private sector (dilution of svern- shares n basiasof standard procedures for
in SOS. ments equity position instead of dis- new issues, possibly in conjunction with
of shares). disposai of governaent equity. eo private
investment may be for capitalization of new
company embodying assets transferred by
soverd Eent.
)Ianagement Acquisition by emagement andler work- Negotiations by govermenta p management.
employee forte of oontroissug interest in g. epoyees and Lenders to cover wide range of
buy-out'. Leveraged manaemntlpoyee buy-out issues.
(n(o) consists of purohase of phrres on
eredit estended either by seller (goveun-
ment) or by fioanialo institutions.
No ownership transfer. Under ABM.A, fee
is payable to owner of productive facil-
ities, lessee assmes full Coeaercial
risk. Under manaaMnt contract, owner
pays for management Skills. while manager
has full management and operational can-
troL. Many
No standard method: see actual eases La
test.
Table 1. (Source Vuyskele: study for the World Bank)
Leases and
management
contracts.
1.21 Review of the methods shown in Table 1.
Method 1 and 2 Securitization and Sale
Under the first two methods of privatization, the state
sells shares to the private sector, as if the enterprise were an
ongoing concern. These methods are not evaluated since most of
the developing countries do not have well developed capital
markets which are necessary to support this approach.
Method 3. Sale of Government or Enterprise assets
Using this method, a government may sell the assets
directly and/or the SOE's may dispose of the major assets.
Generally, while the purpose may be to hive off separate assets
representing different activities, it might also mean selling an
enterprise as a whole. In some cases assets are not technically
sold but are contributed by the government to a new company
formed in conjunction with the private sector. The shares
received by the government in this operation may be sold later.
The sale of assets can take many forms from a sale of
surplus assets to a liquidation that requires restructuring of
the SOEs. The sale of assets is the preferred method when SOE's
are not saleable as ongoing concerns.
Method 4. Reorganization into Components Parts (Fragmentation)
This method permits different methods of privatization to
be applied to different component parts, maximizing the overall
process. If an SOE in the aggregate has various activities
which are unattractive to investors, then fragmentation is an
alternative. On the other hand, the State might want to retain
some components of an SOE while selling others. British Rail,
for example, in addition to its railway assets, first sold a
portfolio of interests in other industries, such as ferries,
hovercraft, hotels, and surplus properties. When facilities
that are attractive to investors are not part of the main
business line, they can be easily disposed of.
Method 5. New Private Investment in SOE.
This method might be used when a government wishes to add
capital to an under-capitalized SOE for their rehabilitation or
expansion. Therefore the state does not dispose of its current
equity, but sells additional equity to private investors and
dilutes the government's equity position. This might result in
joint private/government ownership of the enterprise.
The state might also provide the assets as the contribution
to a new venture. In the case of existing SOEs this would
permit physical rehabilitation or expansion of operations. This
is a preferred method when a sudden sale of government assets
might be politically difficult to carry out (or if the
government wants to secure the property of the assets). A t
a later time, once the transformation has taken place, a gradual
transfer of government ownership could take place more easily
[Vuyskele, 28].
Method 6. Lease or management contracts.
Under this scheme private sector management, skills,
contracts and arrangements are provided under contract to an SOE
or in respect of state-owned assets for an agreed compensation
and period of time. There is normally no ownership transfer,
and no total divestiture of the publicly held assets. A lease
arrangement might increase the effective use of the state
assets. This method might improve the future prospects of
improving the SOE which could be divested at a better price.
There are two mechanisms:
a. Lease. The private sector leases facilities
owned by the state and uses them to conduct business on its own
account [Vuyskele 36]. The terms and conditions for the lessee
to operate the assets or facilities, the compensation to the
state, and the parties' responsibilities are set in the lease.
A feature of this arrangement is that the lessee assumes full
financial responsibility for operating the assets. The lessee
has control over the operations of the assets or facilities
(subject to maintenance and repair covenants), and the
government has the authority specifically granted under the
contract (For example the lease a hotel in Gambia to a hotel
company). This sort of arrangement is recommended in cases such
as the Soviet Union where there had not been transactions in the
past so there are no comparable sales to value the SOEs' assets.
Even if not acknowledged by the current privatization
literature the public sector was involved in these kinds of
arrangements before the term "privatization" came into fashion.
These efforts were known as public leaseholds and they are
discussed in section 1.5. Other examples of joint-ventures
include non-profit institutions such as universities which
provide surplus land to the private sector in order to develop
research parks, or office space. In these cases such
institutions because of their long-term horizon, want to secure
land, but at the same time they assure that the land produces an
income. In some cases, its development increases the land value
and economic activity in the area as an added bonus.
b. Management contract. The contractor, is normally
a company in the same line of business of the enterprise who
assumes responsibility for the operations. Whereas a lessee pays
the state for the use of asset or facilities, the management
contractor is paid for its skills. Management contracts are
widely used in the publicly held hotel sector.
Lease or management contracts are the preferred method for
privatization of an activity in cases when it might not appear
appropriate to divest the assets. This might make in certain
cases their application preferable to other methods of
privatization. The lease could also be an interim solution
previous to a sale. A management contract or a lease, rather
than a sale, is the most desirable method in some instances.
The lease is a preferred alternative if all the operations of an
SOE have ceased, or a run down SOEs is unlikely to respond to
private management expertise [Vuyskele, 40]. This is a
recommendable solution if a government, which has a long time
horizon, wants to secure the property of the assets for the
long term while getting revenues meanwhile.
1.22 Determinants of Potential Techniques.
The methods of privatization are determined by:
a. The government's objectives. The economic strategy of
most governments provides for a combination of objectives. For
example, if a government looks for greater revenue from state
assets, this objective leads to methods that can maximize the
sale price. However this cannot be possible in all countries.
b. Financial conditions and record of performance. The
profitability in terms of revenue generation or budget drain of
the SOE is a key determinant of the degree of difficulty for its
sale or its identification as a potential candidate. The
potential SOEs are not limited to high performing companies.
Loss-making SOEs could be privatized through a variety of
techniques; however restructuring measures are normally
necessary such as physical rehabilitation. SOE's in developing
countries are often without adequate records, have over-valued
assets, and have lacked financial discipline as shown in the
exhibit I.
c. The linkage of the SOE sector of activity to the
economy and its importance for the government. Once the
government has assessed the fundamental objectives for which
enterprises were created and determined whether if these goals
are still valid, it should decide which enterprises should
remain public and which should be privatized or liquidated.
Governments tend to classify enterprises as "strategic", "core"
and "essential" or "non-strategic", "non-core" and
"unessential".
d. Degree of development of the capital market. If, for
example, there are no channels for share distribution and the
investing public is small then private sales to local and
foreign investors are likely to be the predominant method of
sale.
Typical Characteristics of SOE's
Management.
* Lack of accountability at all levels.
* Operate outside the Government budgetary process.
* lack of accurate or up to date financial records.
Physical.
* Under-utilized assets and inadequate planning feasibility
studies for new investments.
* Overvalued assets, accompanied by an unwillingness to
recognize market value.*
* Poorly maintained capital equipment.
* Antiquated production facilities, procedures, and
technology
Operational.
* easy acceptance of financial losses for social reasons.
* Over staffing.
Source [USAID, Guidelines for Privatization, 8]
* (note) In some countries of the Eastern Bloc assets are
referred to, by other literature, as being under-valued.
e. Socio-political factors. The decision-making process
is normally intense in political terms. However some methods
might offer alternatives for dealing with pressures.
Once these factors have been considered, most governments
aim at identifying strategic enterprises which need
rehabilitation and are likely to remain in the public sector for
some time. In most countries no more than 10 or 15 enterprises
are in this group. They include electricity, water, post and
telecommunications, railroad companies, and some mining and
industrial firms that cannot be easily privatized because of
their link to the economy. [Shirley, 1989: 37]
Governments would be wise to then let the remaining SOE's
to begin to fend for themselves [Shirley,1989 :37]. The
government must decide whether the non-strategic enterprises
will be sold, liquidated, or rehabilitated. In order to do this
the governments should clarify the SOE's true situation, by
eliminating gross price distortions, cutting most subsidies, and
Exhibit I
halting most new public investments. If price distortions are
few, the cost and benefit of rehabilitation and continued public
operation can be more easily determined. Most entities will
have to be categorized in term of their potential to earn a
positive return, as well as in terms of the way such enterprises
commonly operate elsewhere.
This thesis proposes the suspension of space-subsidies.
Space subsidies are the space provided free of charge by the
government to its institutions/SOEs. Providing free space
subsidies to SOEs distorts their financial performance
evaluation. This prevents consideration of real asset value,
since no pressure to evaluate the usage efficiency is created.
Most entities should be categorized by their earning potential,
the way private enterprises commonly operate.
No free subsidies in the form of land or facilities should
be given to SOEs that offer services for sale or lease to third
parties. Return must be generated on the invested capital of
these entities. Otherwise they might be subsidizing very
limited groups. The last buyer, for example, will acquire the
goods or services at a price lower than it costs to produce
them.
1.23 Overview of the experience with privatization.
The examination of the World Bank literature above has
shown that divestiture programs need to be tailored to the
circumstances of the particular country. For example, in small
economies with limited capital markets, methods such as
liquidation (see page 2), contracting out, leasing, and
management contracts may be more effective than sales in
restraining an overextended public sector.
Privatization has taken drastically different forms in
different countries. Which are the best methods for each
specific case? Considering a portfolio or even individual
properties, different methods can be used. In Sri lanka and
Malasia, creative approaches that combine most methods have been
developed such as combinations of leases/private sales/public
offerings. In Malasia's Port Kelang, a joint-venture was
arranged to lease the relevant assets and acquire the container
business from the government. In the Soviet Union as in some
Eastern Europe countries where there have been no real estate
transactions, the estimation of real estate market value is
difficult and inaccurate. In these case a method recommended by
Tim Larson consultant on Privatization for the Russian
government is long term lease or joint-venture. This method
permits the state not to dispose of the property now while
generating benefits and economic activity. This way the state
participates in the potential appreciation of the land. However
the use of this approach may be problematic in a country in
desperate need of cash.
In assuming the potential of its enterprises, all elements
should be considered fully. Companies and assets may occupy
attractive market niches which are presently underutilized or
neglected, such as the case of some British Rail subsidiaries.
1.3 SELECTED IMPLEMENTATION ASPECTS.
The literature of the World Bank acknowledges that
privatization programs must account for the different types of
rationales governments might have. Privatization is a relatively
new and experimental activity. Governments of developing
countries, may not have all the necessary conditions for
success. Some lessons that the World Bank has drawn from
divestiture programs for less developed countries are: [Shirley:
1989, 34--36]
a. Divestiture should be treated not in isolation or as
an end in itself, but as part of a broader program of reforms,
which could aim at promoting better allocation of resources,
encourage competition, and develop capital markets.
b. Work is needed to improve the environment for
privatization and to strengthen government management of sales.
c. Transparency. A debate about the privatization merits
is inevitable. The challenge is to make the debate an informed
one. More should be known, for example, on how much subsidizing
goes on the SOEs. Benefits have to be added to the debate if
acceptance to the privatization program is desired.
d. The immediately visible social implications of plant
closures and lay-offs can be severe in the short-term while the
growth of benefits and increases in employment and investment do
not appear until later.
e. The design of a strategy for divestiture and the
classification of SOE's to be liquidated, sold, leased, and so
on, have been useful in clarifying the government's objectives
and approach. However, the more comprehensive the approach, the
slower the process is likely to be, and the more costly. The
formal scheme may interfere with informal closures if
authorities feel encouraged to maintain the operation of SOEs in
a possibly vain attempt to sell them. Care should be taken not
to replace informal actions with formal commitments.
The organizational capability and technical expertise must
be present in order to initiate and implement the transaction.
Every privatization undertaking needs to be carefully planned
and managed. When designing an action plan, it is advisable to
assess the respective merits of alternative techniques. In most
cases, minimum standards or guiding principles must be
conceived to ensure a proper disposition, to maximize the return
to the state, to preserve a fair process for the general
public, and to assure that the purchaser is qualified to run
the acquired enterprise productively. According to Vuyskele,
implementing privatization implies the following:
1.31 Planning and management.
A country needs to be clear in advance about the initial
steps to be taken, and have identified some initial viable
candidates. Planning and management includes the following:
a. The selection of the first enterprise or enterprises
for privatization through sale is key, "as its success or
failure will influence the future of the whole privatization
plan". The strategies for choosing the first candidates for
privatization may be determined by various socio-political
factors. In the case of Egypt, the first privatization addressed
hotels, as these perhaps do not as greatly concern the
population at large.
b. A state may do well divesting gradually its assets
even within a single enterprise.
c. The legal environment influences to privatization. In
the UK, the privatization process was delayed due to the need
for separate pieces of legislation for each part of the process.
d. The administrative structure must be responsible to
the interests of government, interested business circles and
investors, and other relevant parties. Governments must remain
flexible be flexible and allow for ad hoc solutions.
e. The procedures for privatization should safeguard the
public's interest. Private sales particularly should be subject
to minimum standards that ensure orderly disposition, maximum
return to the state, a fair process for the general public, and
assurance that the purchaser is qualified to run the enterprise.
In this case the government may agree with the investor as to
which kind of solution this would involve, or set limitations.
This notion could be linked to the possibility of inserting
rigorous conditions for the unbiased valuation of assets and for
determining the sale price. In the absence of such rules,
irregularities of different kinds may arise and result in not
getting a fair price.
f. The general business environment is fundamental to the
success and sometimes to the feasibility of privatization.
g. A detailed action plan should follow the announcement
of privatization. This should include: objectives, timing,
financing, valuation of companies, studies of adjustments and
prior changes that can increase the possibilities (and/or) price
of the sale and identification of potential privatization
candidates.
1.32 Readying SOE's.
Normally few SOEs are in a condition that permits sale of
land or other transfers to the private sector without readying
measures. No format exists for private sales, which may range
from a restructuring of the company prior to sale as an ongoing
concern to a liquidation following a disposal of assets.
Physical rehabilitation is a concern of this study. The
question is, should necessary physical rehabilitation be done
prior to privatization?
From the standpoint of the consideration of the real asset
value the decision of selling the enterprise in its present
condition is difficult, as its potential value may not be
realized and leaving the government open to criticism for
disposing of the national assets at low prices. It is
concievable that physical rehabilitation may increase the sales
potential of the enterprise and permit the cost to be recovered.
However, as a general rule, rehabilitation of assets prior to
the disposition should be avoided.
1.33 Valuation and Pricing.
The need to maximize potential revenues must be balanced in
determining the conditions for sales. The highest price will
not produce in all cases the best benefits. For example, even if
a transaction (say for a social reason) might yield a low price,
it might be right if it addresses the government's economic,
political, and social objectives.
However even the "best price" is not always the best price.
The pricing of a given SOE must be carried out in the full
context of a broader privatization's program and government's
objectives. It is more important to gain an "aura of success"
than getting the last penny, this can increase the benefits of
the whole program in the long-term. Experience shows that is
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better to err in the side of a "too low price than too high" in
view of the high cost of an operation that fails. [Vuyskele
115]. For the purpose of selling assets (or shares) valuation
and the resulting pricing are sensitive and difficult matters.
In most case such as France or UK companies' share prices
increased too fast and the government were attacked for selling
too low. "While a too low price might create a criticizable
windfall of investors, however too high a price might entail a
failure of the privatization effort." [Vuyslkele 110] The
experience of Great Britain shows that for political reasons
shares in SOEs being privatized are commonly underpriced in the
initial sale. This results, in the new shareholder benefiting
at the expense of the whole country. [Vuyskele, ] Public assets
sold directly to predetermined companies or investors rather
than by public offering involve the risk of political favoritism
and underpricing [Starr, 9].
Only very rough guidelines can be set for SOE valuation.
There are so many different circumstances that any delineation
of the required measures for valuation cannot be set. (This
notion is very important in the context of Chapter 2, which
analyzes issues related to the achievement of the real asset
value.
Methodologies such as discounted cash flow are based on
forecast of future performance and expectations of value
earnings and better capture the variety of different factors
that valuation should take into account. In assuming the
potential for enterprises, real property elements should be
considered fully. e.g companies and assets may occupy
attractive niches or are underutilized.
In some countries the valuation must be carried out using
objective methods that are applied consistently with respect to
the sale of company assets. Serious efforts should be made to
establish the economic value of the assets, especially those
that appear to be overpriced acquisitions.
In general, countries need to develop an approach for
valuing enterprises or assets with sufficient flexibility to
permit the establishment of a price that corresponds
realistically to the level of interest in the private sector.
As to private sales of shares assets, one approach is
competitive bidding or an auction with a price determination in
line with the enterprise's or asset market value.
1.34 Determining Future Ownership.
What is the level of private ownership desired in each case
(partial vs total privatization). The transfer at various
degrees of ownership depends on government objectives and market
conditions. Partial ownership has been maintained when there is
a need for control over some sectors of the economy, or just to
increase efficiency, or when there is a need for gradual
privatization. Partial privatization results in joint state-
private companies. This introduces the risk to private
investors, who have fears about government involvement.
Promoting ownership has been an objective for many privatization
programs. Removing the old distinction between owners and
workers such as in the case of Chile. The divestiture programs
of Peru and El Salvador include the distribution of the
ownership of government land among squatters (see section 3.4).
1.4 REAL ESTATE IN THE PRIVATIZATION OF SOES
The analysis of real estate is basic to privatization
evaluation as described above because of the following:
a. Real estate components, land and buildings, are
capital goods that, together with other production input, labor
and capital, form the capital combination underlying a
production plan.
b. Real property is the most valuable but often a wasted
form of assets. On average, 30% to 50% of a corporate total
assets are real property, and this percentage is much higher in
the public sector. [Chai, 2 ]
c. Real property is an important component of the SOEs'
assets and the government's real property portfolio (RPP).
d. The state-owned sector in developing countries tends
to be large, diverse, and illiquid [Shirley,3]. Real property
assets of SOEs are often under-utilized (see exhibit I).
1.5 PRIVATIZATION PROCESSES THAT INVOLVE REAL ESTATE.
Real estate is increasingly becoming a target of
privatization programs, especially given the impending
transformation of the Soviet Union and Eastern European
countries to a market economy. Most of the real estate
inventory of Moscow, for example, is currently owned by the
State. This inventory includes factories, housing, commercial
buildings.
According to Tim Larson, a consultant for the Russian
Government, Russian authorities are seeking pragmatic methods
for real property privatization. They want to privatize quickly
given their need for money, but only few investors willing to
provide capital. Leasing assets, either in form of assets for
ongoing use or for development of real estate might be a good
alternative, given the absence of past real estate transactions.
Leasing has two advantages: the State may create value on its
land and generate new businesses in the land.
The U.S. public sector at all levels has either disposed
surplus property and assets of various commercial enterprises or
contracted out various services to the private sector before the
labeling of the word "privatization." However, most of these
transactions have not been acknowledged by the privatization
literature. Some examples include:
a. The Charlestown Naval Base, an old U.S Navy facility
in Boston was developed in a joint venture between a private
developer and the State.
b. Public leaseholds created when a public body owning
land leases or rents to a private individual or firm, for a
specified period of time. One of the most frequent proposals for
tenure reform is that most developable urban land be held in
this type of tenure. Some features are that "Leasehold will
provide sufficient security of tenure to allow and encourage
good building provided that the lease period is not less than
likely minimum economic life of the building and provided that
the land rent is not greater than the market value of the site
in its current use." These periods, however, can be very long,
Archer recommends a range of 60 to 120 years, with a common
leasehold being 99 years. Given the rapid growth rate of today's
cities, such time periods become, for practical purposes,
virtually the same as freeholds, unless the lease itself gives
certain kinds of residual controls to the public lessor.
However, the greater the degree of public intervention possible,
the less attractive the lease may be as collateral for credit
being given to the lessee. The use of leasehold puts a public
authority in an excellent position to adapt to changes in urban
form and land use patterns. As leases expire, the property can
simply be released to a lessee who agrees to convert to the use
most appropriate to the changed circumstances. The 60-year
rhythm of renewal is far too slow for the rapid changes in urban
form particularly in the developing countries. One may
generalize that the suitability of many structures and uses in
the older parts of cities in developing countries will require
major functional adaptions on a cycle closer to 20 years than
60. Surprisingly, leaseholds have not been treated nor referred
to by the privatization literature.
c. The sales of public assets, including public lands,
public infrastructure, and public enterprises is another
privatization concept gaining importance. Some public assets
are easier to privatize than others.
The U.S Postal Service owns prime located real estate
that and could be used more productively. In its
restructuring it could sell assets such as downtown
distribution centers next to railroad terminals.
(resulting from the time when a lot of the mail went by
rail). This situation contrasts with the situation of a
competitor, United Parcel Service, that has located its
facilities in less valuable suburban locations.
Railroads are one example of companies that have
discovered the immense value of their real estate, e.g the
Santa Fe Pacific and its Catellus Development Entity. In
Boston, for example, the railroad holdings in the North End
sector could be leased for utilization of air rights over
the tracks.
Housing is another potential area for restructuring
public assets. Unlike education or justice , housing is
not a service that Americans believe government should
produce and manage. Public housing projects could be sold
to tenant cooperatives. In such areas as housing the
government could move its investments in a "rolling
privatization" disposing of some public assets while
augmenting others [Starr, 16].
Given the rising acceptance of "privatization", the above
approaches are currently recommended as a thorough solution to
the aforementioned problems of government. These approaches
serve as background to the consideration of alternative uses to
the current use in government real estate assets held by
obsolete SOE's/entities, in order to fully realize their real
asset value and highest and best use.
Public owners of real estate considering privatization may
dispose of current assets while acquiring new assets as
mentioned above. This is a concern of real property asset
management (RPAM), a strategic concept, which involves the
entire real estate assets of the public sector. The
comprehensive management of all real property, buildings,
leaseholds, contracts and land is included. RPAM provides an
overall vision for decisions such as disposition, privatization,
acquisitions and/or rehabilitations [Isacson, 26]. RPAM aims at
searching for a fit amomg changing real estate characteristics
and needs of the owner/user with the shifting market forces
which drive the economy and the particular organizations, in
order to satisfy the need for land and buildings [LAP, 1986:
60].
1.6 PRIVATIZATION WITH A REAL ASSET MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE
Privatization was previously identified as a topic of
interest for real asset management in an unpublished paper of
the Laboratory for Architecture and Planning (LAP) at M.I.T.
In 1986, the LAP identified privatization as an option that
managers and owners of public real property have. The LAP
recommended also that this option be researched. As of today no
research, has been found with this emphasis.
Privatization as an option in real property asset
management, as suggested by the LAP, raises the following
concerns:
a. Privatization has taken place in recent years as the
chief agenda of many countries worldwide.
b. The complex character of the privatization decision
process implies the consideration of multiple factors other than
real property concerns.
c. Privatization has been taking place independently of
real property management. Most governments do not have adequate
real property management structures. Existing real property
management in public institutions only accounts for historical
costs of real property.
d. Real property asset management, regardless of its
theoretical and practical importance, has received little
attention in both corporate and public settings. RPAM practice
has traditionally been ad-hoc, reactive, and short-sighted,
partly as result to a lack of a supporting body of knowledge
[LAP, ]. Real property managers in public settings do not
participate in the strategic government decision-making.
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This study emphazises the importance of complementing the
current privatization analysis by taking into account real
property asset management practices in oder to improve the
current privatization process. It is essential to identify
theoretical and practical evidence that real asset management
practices would improve the privatization process outcome.
Privatization and real property management literature
assign importance to the consideration of the real asset value
(see section 2.11). The valuation of the real asset value is a
key concern for both real property management and privatization.
However, contradictions that appear in the procedures for
achieving this value in the transactions (see section 2.27)
result in the real property real asset value being generally
ignored.
SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 1.
This chapter provided an overview of current privatization
practice. It introduced the basic concepts of privatization and
divestiture, and dicussed the most used methods of
privatization. It showed that the analysis of real estate as a
component of the assets of the SOE to be evaluated is basically
related to issues of valuation. Further discussion centered on
these assets were privatized as ongoing concerns. Few examples
could be found in the literature of privatization that treat the
experiences of assets sold as real estate. No examples were
found to document changes of uses in the real property of the
SOE's, nor of SOE's identified as potential candidates for
privatization because of their potential highest and best use as
oppossed to their current use.
NOTES OF THE CHAPTER.
1 Divestiture has been linked to the State Owned enterprise,
which can be defined as a publicy owned entity with a separate
,legal personality that earns the bulk of its revenue form the
sale of its goods and services. Implicit in this definition is
the potential for the company to earn a return on its assets.
2 According to the World Bank , government initiatives in the
privatization of State Owned Enterprises (SOE's) and publicly
held assets have increased substantially in recent years. In at
least 83 countries, privatization is the key procedure to
rationalize the SOE's sector in order to reduce its burden on
the fiscal deficit and improve its efficiency.
3 The term "real property" refers to land and buildings
denoting their exclusive use, ownership and disposition. [Bon,
1988:] Real property includes all the interests, benefits, and
rights inherent in the ownership of physical real estate. A
rigth or inherest in real property is also referred to as an
estate. [AIREA, 1987: 5]. Real estate is the physical land and
appurtenances --buildings and improvements-- affixed to the
land-- attached to it by people. One must start defining these
two concepts since some of the literature calls these two terms
indistinctinly.
4 The ejido is a purely Mexican idea, whose origins predate
the Spanish conquest. In 16th-century Spanish the word simply
meant common land. In its modern form the ejido system arose
out the peasant insurgency of Emiliano Zapata and was
institutionalized in the 1930s by President Lazaro Cardenas.
[The Economist, Nov 16th 1991, 49].
5 The possible approaches to privatization and the attendant
issues are covered in detail in Charles Vuyskele, "Techniques of
Privatization of State-Owned Enterprise," Vol 1 World Bank
Discussion Paper 4, Nov 1986.
6. Public Freeholds. This category applies when a public body
is full owner of the land. In urban contexts, it generally
refers to land directly used by the public, such as parks,
roadways, sites of public buildings, etc. In a national context,
it is common for the national Government to own vast areas of
the country in various kinds of forest, conservation, mineral,
recreation, or other types of reserves. These themselves may
have special names, such as baldios in Latin America. In Mexico
a very substantial portion of the country is in elidos, a form
of national ownership, but which clearly defined rights of
occupancy and use by small farmers (elidatarios) [Archer, 47].
CHAPTER 2. THE A REAL PROPERTY ASSET MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE
IN THE CONTEXT OF PRIVATIZATION.
As discussed in the Chapter 1, a real property asset
management perspective is most important for privatization.
Chapter 2 now focuses on the principles of real estate analysis
for a privatization decision-making that takes into account
sound real asset management practices. These elements include
particularly the achievement of real asset value and related
issues. It further presents some guidelines that account for
these concerns.
2.1 REAL ASSET VALUE ISSUES.
2.11 The Achievement of the Real Asset Value
The real asset value of real property is normally
identified as the maximum value obtainable in exchange, the
market value. Market value is defined as the highest price
which a property will bring in a competitive and open market
under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and
seller each acting prudently and knowledgeably, and assuming the
price is not affected by undue stimuli. The market value
estimate is based on the analysis of all relevant economic
factors considered in the three valuation methods mentioned
below, and on the highest and best use of a particular piece of
real property. According to the real estate appraising theory
three classic approaches are designed to reflect the respective
sales (comparison analysis); economic (income analysis); and
physical (cost analysis) characteristics of the subject property
(see section 2.24).
According to the privatization literature examined in
Chapter 1, real asset value can not in all situations be
achieved. It does however, provide an important benchmark that
should be evaluated continually.
2.12 Highest and Best Use
Highest and best use is defined as the logical, legal and
most probable use that will produce the highest net return to
the land over a sustained period of time. The principle of
highest and best use is an important concept for valuation. For
valuation purposes, the evaluation of the highest and best use
is of importance in the relational analysis within the valuation
three approaches. The accuracy of the valuation is related
directly to the appraisal conclusion on highest and best use.
2.2 CONSIDERATIONS IN RELATION TO REAL ASSET VALUE.
2.21 The Consideration of opportunity costs.
Valuation of costs is impossible without an explicit
account of opportunity cost --the satisfactions foregone [Bon,
1990: 61]. Opportunity cost is the value foregone in having
one prospective opportunity displaced by the decision to take
another course of action. According to Buchanan [1969; 28] "Any
profit opportunity that is within the realm of possibility but
which is rejected becomes a cost of undertaking the preferred
course of action." The only sense in which cost can influence
choice is the perception at the very moment of choice of the
satisfactions foregone. For example, the choice to hold under-
utilized real property, has an opportunity cost. This cost is
determined by the difference of the amount the government is
saving by choosing this option and the profit the property could
generate if the property was rented or sold in the open market
to a third party. The residual are the satisfactions foregone
since the funds could be invested in something else. Say a real
property produces 40 dollars monthly, but there are other
alternative uses that can generate higher revenues on the
property. The highest and best use would generate 120 dollars
monthly. The differential between the two is the opportunity
cost of the choice of holding the property in its current use.
Privatization analysis should consider the opportunity cost of
holding real property; the management actions not taken; and
the opportunities foregone.
The concept of opportunity cost is independent of whether
the land or any other assets are privately or publicly owned.
The conception of cost is the same. However, the actual measure
of the opportunity cost varies according to the institutional
structure, since the restrictions and opportunities differ.
The concept of opportunity cost is essential in large
public institutions whose main activity is not real estate
business but who are owners, tenants, or renters of vast amounts
of real property. Regardless of their willingness to accept
it, these organizations are related to the real estate
business. [Ebert, 62 ]. These organizations do not regard their
real property as having an investment potential hence
sacrificing a possible income.
2.22 Changes of use in real property
In any economy, at every moment some buildings and other
capital goods are utilized for purposes distinct from the one
originally intended '. Privatization analysis should account for
the changing use of real property occupied by SOEs/entities in
relation to changing economic conditions. Economic forces
influencing public organizations affect the patterns of decision
making concerning the investment in, divestment and changes of
uses of buildings and land. This dynamic should respond to what
the market decides is the highest and best use of a particular
piece of real property.
Consideration of this dynamic contrasts with the current
privatization processes where the buildings and land occupied by
SOEs remain in their use regardless of the fact that its highest
and best use is different from the current one. This distortion
is due to the fact that public organizations ignore the
opportunity cost of holding real property. They also ignore the
distortions created by subsidies in the form of free space to
their SOEs.
2.23 Useful life vs Economic life.
A useful benchmark for measuring the changes of real
property in relation to the changing economic conditions is the
tradeoff of the useful-life vs economic-life. Economic life is
a function of economic viability. It denotes the period during
which the improvements on a specific site are capable of
producing a fair return on the land value. Useful life denotes
the period over which a facility can be economically competitive
and functional for use as designed [Albritton, 85].
These two conditions of buildings in relation to land must
be continually evaluated in order to achieve the highest and
best use of real property and therefore its real asset value.
Real property improvements might reach the end of their
economic life faster than their physical life. This is
illustrated by the concept of real property cycle 2. The
distinguishing feature of land in this context is the longevity
of the asset. Land is a truly a non-depletable resource,
whereas buildings wear out in a few years. Values of land and
buildings change at different rates and/or in different
directions, depending on the economic forces which influence
them.
To illustrate the economic-life and useful-life tradeoff in
a privatization situation, one could draw the following
hypothetical situation: an SOE may use a relatively new facility
which could be physically expected to serve its needs for many
years and therefore have a long useful life. However, this
facility may be located in an area that is experiencing rapid
land value appreciation and therefore may not be capable of
producing a net income sufficient to satisfy a reasonable return
on the land. At this point in time, demolition/conversion/use-
intensification of such a facility and/or redevelopment of the
site should be considered by the government. The SOE function,
if feasible, should be relocated (see Case Study 4.2) . For a
privatization analysis that considers a sound real asset
management perspective, the useful-life versus economic-life
tradeoff is important in the following situations:
. In the identification of potential privatization candidates
which are only selected based on their impact on the fiscal
deficit in current privatization practice.
. At the point in time when an SOEs' real property economic
life has expired regardless of its useful life, different
alternatives should be evaluated such as conversion of use or
divestiture.
2.24 Implementing Valuation considerations
Valuation considerations in privatization were introduced
in chapter 1. This section expands some of those concepts.
Privatization practice should carefully treat the concept of
valuation. Some important factors in valuation in order to
achieve the real asset value in privatization are:
a. It is important for the Government to achieve
systematic knowledge of its current real estate holdings and
their values as a means of achieving value maximization.
Privatization candidate selection and decision-making could be
improved if it had access to accurate information regarding the
real property assets of the government and the real property
occupied by the SOE's/entities.
b. Based on the experience of many countries, only rough
guidelines can be set for SOE valuation in privatization
analysis. There are many different circumstances and
characteristics of assets and any delineation of the required
measures for valuation cannot be set [Vuyslsteke, 111] . There
are, however, important factors that could improve the valuation
of the real property components of the privatization candidates
and provide alternative criteria for their potential
identification.
Privatization and real property management use the same
three basic approaches for estimating fair market value:
1. The market approach estimates the market value of a
subject property based on a comparison of the prices paid in
actual market transactions and on asking prices for currently
available assets. The market value approach may present two
problems:
a. The comparable sales are liquidation transactions.
Experienced owners or realtors would not expect to sell under in
hard times. However, some governments undergoing privatization
processes are in a hurry to get revenues. A massive divestment
may create a liquidation climate.
b. There are not enough comparable sales in the market.
The market approach is often hard to use since there might not
be enough, or any, transactions in the marketplace. In this
case the market approach can be a troublesome parameter if used
for establishing the price of an enterprise or asset. In the
Soviet Union, for example, there have been no volume of market
transactions in the past 80 years. Therefore, the determination
of market value creates a problematic issue for the government
and for potential investors. On the one hand the government
expects to get more from its property, but on the other hand
there might not be potential investors with enough investment
funding willing to pay such price.
2. The income approach simulates the economics of a particular
property and can be most useful if the appraisal subject has the
potential for rental or sale, as does an investment property.
It involves the capitalization of anticipated net income or
cash flow projections and discounting them for the time value of
money to indicate a present value. In addition, a present value
of the projected residual value must be estimated and added to
the present value of net income. The income approach sometimes
distorted when an enterprise is under bad management or when
financial losses are accepted for social reasons. Then there is
the problem of governments trying to keep the enterprises
running regardless of the real property highest and best use.
3. The cost approach stresses the physical characteristics of
the improvements and economic value of the land. This approach
uses replacement as an indicator of value. In privatization
practice there is a trend to evaluate market value by
replacement cost, e.g the case of Poland. This situation is
explainable since governments want to get back what it is
supposed that the State paid for a particular investment, or
else there is a perception of potential problems arising as a
result of accusations of giving away the assets. The problem,
according to James Stephenson from USAID El Salvador, is that
the replacement cost approach tends to overvalue many of the
enterprises.
The replacement cost should just be considered if the
institution being closed is critical to the state and cannot be
operated by the private sector. Otherwise, the consideration of
replacement cost is important only for the new private entity,
not for the government. The rationale for this is the fact that
the government is interested in evaluating the use-value
exclusively for itself as the revenues an enterprise reports.
The use-value for society is important, but it is the same since
it can be provided by the private sector. There is a sacrifice
that must also be made, related to the beneficiaries of each
enterprise. They must be as well considered but its
determination is out of the scope of this study. The exclusive
use of the replacement cost approach, with no determination of
the space needs of the future organization, may fail to detect
the under-utilization typical of that created by SOEs for
practices such as subsidized space. From a government
standpoint, it would be better to consider market value when
analyzing an entity for its worth to the government. Finally,
improvements represent sunk costs from an economic view, so are
irrelevant in estimating current value.
2.25 Use Value and Exchange Value.
Real property may have both a use value and a exchange
value. According to Marc Louargand Value in use is the true
worth of the asset to the owner/buyer/seller. Owners and buyers
estimate this value on an ex ante basis. Their estimates
compete in the market place to form the Value in exchange. If
value in use to one particular owner is lower than to others the
value in exchange becomes the predominant form of value.
For the practical purposes of this thesis the value in use
for a particular government is determined by its estimate of net
present value (NPV) of the revenues a given piece of real
property could produce, given its current use in the production
of income or services. For this piece of real property there
may be investors willing to estimate the worth of the asset in
uses different than the current one. Their estimates --together
with those of the government-- compete in the market place to
form the value in exchange. The value in exchange is therefore
deemed as the market value.
Speculative buying and selling may drive up the price of
real property, and this price may then determine the use by
setting the lower limit on the income stream that could be
obtained from the products it helps produce.
For example, an older government facility is located in an
area where increased number of real estate transactions have
driven up prices of real property. Since the output revenues
that this particular property in its current use could produce
are unaffected, the value in use for the government keeps the
same. However the exchange value rises since there are
investors who would be willing to consider this real property
for other more profitable uses.
The decision to sell or keep a particular good, or a
portion of the good will depend on the comparison of value in
use and value in exchange. Ideally the use value should always
be higher than the market value or the two should be in
equilibrium. This means that in order to keep a property the
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value in use for the owner should be higher or at least the same
as the market value, that should reflect the expectations of
other actors in the marketplace.
The relationship between use value and exchange value of a
good is by no means static. It changes with changing economic
conditions. Some of the causes of change in this relationship
are: a) changes in the owner's preference structure; and b)
changes in the properties [Bon :101 1.
The following model suggested by Marc Louargand compares
use value for the government on the land as the rent it can bear
vs the exchange value denoted by the market value.
If one sets the graph in which axis X is rent for the
government, and axis Y is market value of the property.
Line al denotes the actual market value of the property.
Line bl shows the rent that an enterprise could give to the
state.
a2
AT THE BREAKEVEN POINT
bl(NPV) = al
RENT (NPV)
LU
V
a
The following are two applications:
a) The determination of whether space is being
subsidized. The property is subsidized if the rent is below the
market value of the area. This would imply that the property is
not in its highest and best use. If the rent is at or above
market value, then the enterprise is profitable and the space is
not subsidized. A property in its highest and best use could
produce the second line in the graph.
b) To evaluate the possibilities of providing initially
rent free real property in order to generate investors. Once
the enterprise starts generating revenue, the company will start
paying rent to the state. This would last for a determined
period of time. Then if the enterprise reaches or surpasses
the break-even point, it will pay rent above the market. In
the meantime the property market value may have gone from al to
a2, in which case the user may be asked to buy at the new price
of the property.
The model might be used if the State wants to give impulse
to new enterprises which would not invest in land, but is
progressively going to render the state a rental amount. The
State will decide in the future to sell or retain the property
as the need for space at that particular point in time shows.
2.26 Complementarity.
The complementarity among properties refers to the fact
that some properties may be necessary to fully utilize other
properties and/or enhance value of other properties. For
example, an office building might not be utilized effectively
unless it is complemented by an adequate parking structure. Also
the sum of the individual value of the office building and the
parking structure is likely to be less than the value of the two
properties combined. This notion can be extended to an entire
portfolio of real estate properties to mean that the level of
complementarity among properties may increase or decrease the
total value of the portfolio. [Chai, 22 ]
2.27 Issues in the Achievement of Fair Market Value
The achievement of the real asset value poses some
contradictions for privatization and RPPM. In relation to the
evaluation of real property components, there seems to be a
contradictory perspective regarding the achievement of a fair
market value or real asset value of the transaction (see Chapter
1). From a real property management perspective, and in some
cases of privatization, the maximization of the real asset value
is a desired goal. However, the highest price might not be the
best price in the privatization process. Key privatization
guidelines address the problem restraining the possibility of
changing uses in the real property used by SOEs. Literature
such as the Guidelines for Country Privatization of USAID, for
example, state that "precipitous privatization can be perilous
and the maximum price may not be the optimum price. "3 Therefore,
it states that raising cash through divestiture should not
normally be a priority objective in a program of privatization.
The argument follows that "Where real estate constitutes an
important portion of the assets of an enterprise, land
speculators tend to be separated from the "legitimate business
builder" [AID, 26]. It is therefore more important to have a
"right buyer" that get the right price. This by leaving the
land in the hands of the Government, and providing the state
enterprise with a long-term lease when it has a genuine
commitment to expand the business with additional investment,
new technology, new markets and new management skills. The
guidelines then suggest obtaining a commitment to maintain a
facility in its present location and to use prohibitions against
dismantling and selling facilities for use elsewhere.
These guidelines might be applicable in some cases; however
the aforementioned prohibitions may prevent real property from
achieving its highest and best use and its real asset value
since:
a. The guidelines represent a bias against considering
alternative real property uses or conversions in SOE's. The
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existing SOE's function could be relocated to different
facilities and the existing real property left for another use.
Real estate is in most cases the most valuable asset SOEs have.
b. The guidelines bias the market forces, which should
be the ones to identify the best and highest use for a
particular property or enterprise, without intervention from the
state.
c. The guidelines use a narrow connotation of land
speculators which might bias a government's perception towards
possible bidders and solutions. Real estate developers have
made a positive impact in many places by identifying and putting
real property to their highest and best use, different in many
cases from the ones they were created for. For example, the
first attempt in Moscow to privatize real estate was made in the
form of an auction of four buildings. Commenting the results of
this auction, a high-ranking Russian authority commented that
despite the fact that the assets were sold, it was a real shame
that they were bought by the non-productive sector, meaning a
bank. The buyer, on the other hand, a new bank which was
attempting to buy only one building for its administrative
offices, ended up investing in three out of the four buildings.
These buildings are now being renovated. (Other examples which
can illustrate this position are addressed in the case studies
in chapter 4).
d. If an enterprise is considered a candidate for
privatization but the government is considering stipulating
conditions for its sale such as putting limitations on
dissembling an enterprise. These arguments might make sense from
the standpoint of assuring that sources of employment, for
example, are maintained by keeping the enterprises working.
However from a real property management standpoint this scheme
hinders the real property resources achieving their highest and
best use. This might prove negative in the context of achieving
best use of the country resources.
2.3 A PROPOSAL FOR GUIDELINES FOR PRIVATIZATION.
This section proposes guidelines for a privatization
approach that takes into consideration both the basic
privatization considerations described in chapter 1 and the real
property management practices examined in Chapter 2. These
guidelines aim at evaluating real property at the strategic and
the tactical level.
These guidelines are by no means an exclusive alternative,
but a compendium of steps which leave areas open for future
expansion in other types of elements could be aggregated as
other real property considerations are taken into account or as
more research is done in the field of real property asset
management.
STEP 1 Review the need for the privatization program.
This step aims at establishing the scale and the nature of
government privatization/divestiture needs; checking a number of
key factors that set the rationale for its proposed
privatization scheme; and identifying the pragmatic, political,
and operative reasons that show the need for a complementary
concept to current privatization/divestiture programs. This step
should take into account the principles drawn in Chapter 1.
STEP 2 The definition of objectives.
The specific goals and objectives that a government
establishes for its involvement in privatization have important,
if not crucial, implications for the selection of privatization
methods. In the case of this particular work the basic criteria
to be evaluated refers to the achievement of the real asset
value and the highest and best use. This criteria is important
for a privatization scheme that takes into account real property
management practices. For the definition of strategies (which
is the step 6 of this methodology) the definition of objectives
is certainly important.
All objective definitions must reconcile with technical
studies. In order to consider real property market value and
achieve highest and best use the privatization program must
consider additional criteria besides the SOEs influence on the
fiscal deficit or the feasibility of the SOEs' activities being
executed by the private enterprise. Additional criteria for the
identification of potential candidates is following: a) the
tradeoff of value in exchange vs value in use; b) the tradeoff
of useful-life vs economic-life; c) the evaluation of the
highest and best use vs current use; and d) the consideration to
the opportunity cost by means of the cost of subsidies and
foregone rents. Then, the analysis should follow:
a. Does the enterprise's real property have more potential for
alternative use than for ongoing use?
b. Is it feasible to relocate the function and change the real
property components to a higher and best use?
If the answers are positive, then a conversion process
should be initiated. This is important since a prompt decision
on the method would shorten the evaluation process. One of the
worst problems of the privatization process is the pressure for
promptness and the lack of personnel adequate to this end.
STEP 3 The planning and management process.
This step should check the privatization process plan and
management. It should check into the first privatization
candidates in order to evaluate if they are achieving sucessfull
implementation.
STEP 4 The elimination of distortions.
The appraissal of the privatization program should identify
those distortions that prevent the SOEs fending for themselves.
This must be achieved to clarify the SOEs true situation.
Distortions might be checked by means of the following: a) the
lack of consideration to opportunity cost; b) the use of space
subsidies; c) the lack of consideration to the value in use vs
value in exchange tradeoff; and d) the need for new investments
for physical rehabilitation vs the potential for alternative
uses.
STEP 5 SOEs' Real Property Evaluation
Potential candidates' real property must be evaluated as
follows:
a) Valuation of the property. This must be done
according to the country's valuation laws, the principles
proposed in Chapter 1, section 2.3 and appendix D.
b) Evaluation of alternative uses that the property could
have.
c) Determination of possibilities for relocation.
Relocation must be considered: a) if the economic life of the
real property components of an enterprise has surpassed its
useful life; b) if an alternative use is suggested for the
existing buildings and land; and c) if the use-value is less
than the exchange value.
e) Executing an area analysis in which the real property
occupied by GOES institutions/SOE's in a determined area are
identified, checking for criteria which might be of interest for
evaluating alternative uses to real property.
d) Execution of a post-occupancy evaluation (see appendix
E) in order to determine the facilities adjustment to the
institution necessities and whether the space is used
efficiently.
Once these factors have been considered, most governments
aim at identifying key enterprises which need rehabilitation and
are likely to remain in the public sector for some time, or that
are non-core and should be begin to fend for themselves.
STEP 6 Determine Privatization Method.
Given a single candidate or a number of them, the
objectives and criteria defined, and the evaluation of this
candidate/candidates, a selection among different strategies
could be made to determine the best means of action.
Privatization methods proposed in Chapter 1 that consider
the real property asset management practices suggested in
Chapter 2 include: a) to dispose real estate as is; b) to do
nothing and continue operating the institution/SOE in the real
property, with improvements; c) to dispose the real estate as
a whole; d) to dispose the real estate by parts; d) to
undertake a joint venture along with a real property developer;
g) to give a long-term lease; h) to keep for a period of time
and then sell.
Besides the divestment/privatization options proposed,
other additional management options that might maximize real
asset value should be considered as well, such as: a)
Relocation of public entities/SOE's whose real property offer
potential for a higher and best use; b) market or property
modifications; c) use intensification; d) real estate
conversion; e) a mixed combination of alternatives.
The determination of methods depends also on the pressures
of the environment. If the objective is to generate revenues to
the State, and the State is in desperate need of funds, methods
such as sale could be preferable to a more evenly distributed
income coming from a long-term lease.
When the objective is to maximize potential income from
divestment while avoiding a negative impact on future space
needs. The criteria, in this case, could evaluate mechanisms
that would permit the transference of the real property for a
limited amount of time, such as leasing or joint ventures.
Therefore, the government might reexamine its need for the
property in the future and might maximize the potential income
distributed in a long span of time.
STEP 7 The privatization program institutional framework.
This step must revise the current institutional structure
of the privatization program to check for inconsistenccies such
as: a) lack of clearly defined initiatives; b) Lack of
centralized authority; c) pressures on the different
initiatives; d) problems among different privatization actions
and/or initiatives.
STEP 8 Real property inventory and management structure
As mentioned in section 2.24, a key issue to achieve a real
property real asset value is the knowledge of current holdings.
This would require the tracking the existence and accuracy of
the current inventories and the current real property management
structure. Does the real property inventory and real property
management structure support the privatization program?
SUMMARY
This thesis, for methodological purposes, limited its
discussion to one issue: the consideration of real asset value
and highest and best use. The achievement of the real asset
value and of the highest and best use of the real property
occupied by public enterprises/entities is an important concern
for privatization analysis, regardless of the fact that the
purpose of a program or particular transaction may not be the
generation of revenues. The chapter proposed some real asset
management prectices by which current privatization practice
could be improved.
As observed above, in privatization with an asset
management perspective, there are real property considerations
besides valuation concerns which are important for the
identification and evaluation of privatization candidates: a)
the evaluation of the economic life and useful life tradeoff; b)
the identification of potential candidates based on their
potential for a higher and better use thanthe current use; and
c) the evaluation of the value in use and value in exchange
tradeoff.
NOTES OF THE CHAPTER.
1 As Lachmann [1978a : 3] argues:
Each capital good is, at every moment, devoted to what in the
circumstances appears to its owner to be its "best" i.e its
most profitable use, the word best indicates a position on a
scale of alternative possibilities. Changing circumstances will
change that position [...] Hence, we cannot be surprised to
find that at each moment some durable capital goods are not been
used for the purpose they were originally designed. [ ... ] In
each case the change in use means that the original plan in
which the capital good was intended to play its part has gone
astray. In most of the arguments about capital encountered
today these facts and their implications, many of them crucial
to a clear understanding of the nature of economic progress, are
almost completely ignored. [Bon, 1988 : 26]
2 Real property has a life cycle. Real property has a life
cycle which starts and ends with a vacant lot, the so-called
unimproved land. Land is truly a non-depletable resource its
value may appreciate, whereas most buildings wear out in a
period of time and might depreciate. Buildings have many
parallel lives: physical, economic, and technological. Many
buildings can become economically obsolete when they cannot
accommodate to the changing objectives and needs of complex
organizations or are in the wrong location. The forces of
change that bring about obsolescence can be related to changing
aspirations or objectives of those organizations. Land and
buildings should be analyzed separately to include opportunities
of replacing just the building rather than replacing both the
building and the land [Chai, 5].
3 Raising immediate cash through the sale of assets should
not normally be a priority objective in a program of
privatization, though it is critical that new owners have a
meaningful financial stake in the success of a privatized firm.
Some of the above variables can then be factored into the
valuation study, with quantified estimates of what each warranty
or concession might be worth, as backstop information for use in
negotiating the final terms of sale.[AID 301.
CHAPTER 3 THE GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR (GOES)
PRIVATIZATION PROCESS AND REAL PROPERTY INVENTORY.
This chapter examines the process of privatization of the
GOES within the redefinition of its role in the economy. It
tests the existence of technical and political barriers to an
approach that takes into account sound asset management
practices.
The chapter contents are the following: first, it examines
the basic issues in the adjustment program of the GOES; second,
it introduces the GOES privatization of SOEs process; third, it
introduces the divestiture process that has as a purpose
generating revenues to the GOES; fourth, it introduces the El
Salvador Pais de Propietarios (PESPP) El Salvador country of
proprietorship, program; fifth it introduces the GOES RPP; and
sixth, it analyzes opportunity cost and subsidies in the RPP.
3.1 BASIC ISSUES IN THE ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM OF
THE GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR (GOES).
A deep structural change is now occurring in El Salvador
within the public sector. This change comes as result of a move
towards a market economy and public sector reduction in a
drastic contrast to the expansionist and interventionist role in
the economy assummed by the former government 1. The GOES has
initiated a redefinition which includes a Structural Adjustment
Program (PAE) which "consists in adapting the level of expenses
in the country to the level of income [FUSADES, April/1990: 2].
The following are the policies of the new PAE:
A) Redefinition of the state's role in the economy.
According to the 1989-1994 Social and Economic Plan of the PAE,
the government's global economic strategy consists of four basic
principles: a) private property as a necessary condition for
production; b) free market to insure the optimal deployment of
resources; c) free competition to guarantee the fuctioning of
the market; and d) the State as a participant in the economy
limited to those functions which are its concern and/or to those
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tasks that cannot be developed by the private sector and that
are socially desirable. The state should not compete in
productive functions that concern the private sector; moreover,
it should not monopolize these activities [CENITEC, 2].
B) Full and efficient usage of the country's resources.
There is an urgent need to improve the efficiency of the use of
resources in order to achieve a higher rate of return.
C) Reduction of the 1989 fiscal deficit of 1500 million
colones, (4.5 % Gross National Product (GNP) ) characterized by
excessive public expenses designated for operational purposes
(80% for public salaries). In 1989 financial cuts in
important social sectors such as education, health and housing,
as well as in infrastructure building and maintenance were
enormous [Wisecarver, -]. According to Wisecarver, four of the
twenty autonomous institutions - the National University, the
municipal system, the hospitals, and ISTA (Instituto Salvadoreno
de Reforma Agraria) - have represented the major part of the
total GOES deficit.
D) The reduction of the influence of the state is due to
the redefinition of its role in the economy and to the failure
of the previous government's plans. This implies radical
contraction of labor 2 and, since 1991, of land owned by the
State.
The GOES Structural adjustment includes two major programs
- the Economic Development Plan and the Social Development Plan.
Both involve privatization and divestiture of government assets.
The programs are as follows:
1. The Economic Development Program: a) The process of
privatization 1989-1991, b) The divestiture of government real
property.
2. The Social Development Initiative: The "El Salvador
Pais de Propietarios Initiative" (El Salvador Country of
Proprietorship).
3.2 THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS.
Privatization is a key issue in the GOES estructural
adjustment program (PAE) which seeks to promote economic
development by reducing the government's major fiscal deficit,
reducing the public-sector size, and transferring functions that
the state has managed inefficiently. The scope of this program
aims at privatizing any government function that could be
supported outside the public sector, given the GOES fiscal
limitations.
The following analysis of the privatization program of the
GOES follows these steps: first, it highlights the major
components and actions of this program from 1989 to 1991;
second, it describes the major actions ahead; third, the
problems found by this program; fourth, it examines this program
in light of the proposition presented in Chapter 1. The
privatization program from 1989 to 1991 has focused on the
following actions:
a. The denationalization of public functions such as the
export marketing boards, including Instituto Nacional del Cafe
(INCAFE), Instituto Nacional del Azucar (INAZUCAR), and the
financial sector (nationalized in 1982).
b. The closing, leasing, or contracting out of government
services or functions that can be provided by the private
sector, such as the transference of educational services and
administration such as the Instituto Tecnologico Centroamericano
to Fundacion Educacional para el Desarrollo Economico (FEPADE).
c. Complete or partial divestiture or liquidation of
state owned enterprises SOE's, or entities which have the most
impact on the fiscal deficit, for example, the definite closing
of the Instituto Nacional de Abasteciminetos (IRA), paraestatal
institution in charge of regulating grains and milk prices.
d. The closing of government services which could be
provided by the private sector. The liquidation of the
Instituto Nacional de Vivienda Urbana (IVU), followed by
restructuring to integrate the program of this institution to
the housing plan 1989-1994.
The privatization of SOEs has not had as its focus real
property; however real property is affected. Some candidates
for privatization which are the subject of analysis of this
thesis (see appendix 3 for further information) are the
following: a) The closing of the Instituto Salvadoreno de
Investigaciones del Cafe (ISIC); b) The Hotel Presidente; c)
The Feria Internacional De El Salvador (FIES); and d) the
Lechuza tube factory.
The privatization program has had two initiatives. First,
a loose decentralized decision-making process has prevailed in
the privatization process from 1989 to 1991. The effort existed
under institutions/committes ranging from the President and the
Consejo de Ministros to the different institutions involved such
as ministries. Second, a centralized privatization decision-
making process by means of a privatization commission was
established in May 1991. [La Prensa Grafica, 4/8/91, 2]. The
commission has the responsibility to make the privatization
program succeed and to identify and analyze potential
candidates.
3.3 THE DIVESTITURE PROCESS.
The GOES divestiture program aims at raising revenues by
means of selling government real property which is vacant or
empty. The 1990 budget calls for an extraordinary disposition
of twenty millon colones (eight colones = one U.S. dollar) of
surplus real property assets. This exceptional measure was
taken because of the extraordinary fiscal crisis that resulted
from the decline of income tax; which in turn was due to the
fall in world coffee prices. This program includes:
a. Vacant downtown land previouly occupied by government
facilities destroyed by the 1986 earthquake.
b. Real property belonging to institutions such as Instituto
De Vivienda Urbana (IVU) and Fondo Social para La Vivienda.
These institutions have offered their land on the open
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market by means of newspaper advertisements.
c. The IVU land and/or building portfolio, worth 1000 million
colones. This disposal aims at investing the revenues
from a potential sale in the housing program either by:
. Sale of land and/or buildings to private investors.
The old IVU buildings worth 21000000 colones, for
example.
. Transference of land destinated for housing for the
PESPP program (see next section). This program is
executed jointly with IVU and Corporacion Salvadorena
de Inversiones (CORSAIN).
Housing and apartment units sale of property rights to
their current occupants.
d. The divestiture of assets of institutions being privatized.
The INAZUCAR and INCAFE, for example, includes facilites for
uses such as: administration, coffee grain processing, and
sugar cane processing facilities (ingenios) . A complete analysis
of the results of these initiatives is beyond the scope of this
document.
For the GOES, the divestiture of real property assets is
neither considered part of the current privatization effort, nor
as part of the restructuring/adjustment program, nor as an
option in the five-year GOES plan.
The emphasis of the GOES privatization program on the
generation of income has been relatively small. What are the
reasons why the state should give more emphasis to the
generation of revenues? (see section 5.1).
3.4 THE EL SALVADOR PAIS DE PROPIETARIOS (PESPP) PROCESS.
The housing program is a major component of the Plan de
Desarrollo Social. This initiative aims at reducing the effects
of the PAE in approximately 65% of the population living in
extreme poverty 3. A subset of this program is the "El Salvador
Pais de Propietarios" (PESPP) program--El Salvador Land of
Proprietorship 4. The PESPP aims at utilizing the dynamics of
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private property in low-income sectors, by means of the
following measures: expedite the legalization--by selling land
and tenure to low-income communities living on government land;
enable access to credit to people who traditionally have not had
such access. The PESPP program attempts the following:
. Gathering an inventory of publicly-owned real
property, that could be used for the construction of popular
housing. The inventory is known as "El Banco de Tierras".
. Coordinating the disposal of 50% of the land owned by
the State and the municipal system. This excludes forestry
reserves and highway and train rights. This program will give
600,000 titles of proprietorship to low-income families.
Obtaining revenues through the disposal of publicly
held land designated for financing the investment on land for
other low income housing projects.
The PESSP program takes place in a context of haste,
provoked by political pressures, for distribution of the
increasingly scarce land such as the following:
a. The distribution of government held land to
communities was one prerequisite to end the war, now in its 11th
year of conflict. This was a compromise made on October 1991
between the GOES and FMLN at the U.N. Peace Talks.
b. Recent occupation of land by the homeless and by
squatters has provoked an issue of great concern to the
Salvadorean community. Most properties occupied have been
government owned.
c. A real property inventory was key to these pressures,
as discussed in section --. However, it is important to consider
why there was not such pressure on the State until recently.
3.5 ISSUES IN THE REAL PROPERTY PORTFOLIO.
The GOES PAE policies outlined above call for change in the vast
real estate portfolio concentrated in the hands of GOES
institutions and enterprises. An inventory started in 1989 by
Vice Ministerio de Vivienda (VMV) (Vice Ministry of Housing)
reports on table 3.1 partial data of the real property inventory
of GOES institutions.
3.51 The Inventory size.
The partial amount of land reported is 948,659,375 square
varas (V2 ) (one vara is equivalent to 0.83 meters), equivalent
to 769,078,150 square meters (m2 ) [186,515 acres] or 769 square
kilometers (Km2) . Considering that the size of the country is
20, 000 km2, almost four percent of the territory is owned by the
government. Most of this real property inventory is vacant.
The GOES is by far the largest landowner of single ownership in
a country where constitutionally the area for a property cannot
exceed 445 HA. The GOES, as the major owner of urban and rural
land, maintains most of the "free" land for development of
vacant or under-utilized properties. Therefore, the GOES
creates land scarcity, uncontrolled growth of cities and
subutilization of infrastructure.
The amount of land in this inventory might appear small in
relation to the country size if one considers countries such as
the US, where the government owns 33% of the land.
However, it is a large proportion in a country so small and
overpopulated (300 inhabitants per Km2 or 1.23 inhabitants per
acre) . Scarcity of land is a critical issue in this country
where a majority of the population are not land owners. There
have been various government interventions ' to redistribute
private land but no effort has been directed toward the
extensive publicly-owned land inventory that is idle.
Added to this consideration, there has been a dramatical
decrease in the amount of urban and rural vacant land available
for development that could be sold on the open market. This
decrease on land parallels the increasing pressures for the
distribution of the remaining land - either by squatters (see
section 3.3) and/or by the development community (see section
3.2). These pressures, added to the need of GOES to get
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GOE-S REAL PROPERTY INVENTORY
INSTITUTION
M A G
MINIST.CULTURA Y COMUNIC.
MINIST.DE EDUCACION
MINIST.DE ECONOMIA
MINIST.DE HACIENDA
MIIIST. DEL INTERIOR
M!.NIST DE JUSTICIA
M.:NIST.DE LA PRESIDENCIA
MINIST. DE RELAC.EXTER.
MINIST. DE SALUD
MINIST.DE SEGU.PUB.
MINIST.DE TRABAJO
M O P
PODER EJECUTIVO
PODER JUDICIAL
A N D A
A N T E L
BCO. FOMENTO AGROPECUARIO
ALCALDIA USULUTAN
C E L
FERROCARRILES DE EL SALV.
FISCALIA GRAL.REPUB.
FINATA
FONDO SOCIAL
G O E S
I C R
I R A
I S S
I S T A
I S T U
I V U
NUMBER OF
PROPERTIES
85
90
850
4
300
150
30
1
3
200
60
4
800
5
1
50
40
52
6
135
140
6
180
25
300
9
1
3
35
20
35
AREA
V2
24,913,353.09
1,021,233.17
26,316,763.27
50,103.83
46, 994, 524. 29
12,660,163.19
789,267.39
90C.33
10,911.10
2,125,870.13
22,202,033.15
43,833.70
213,876,640.78
86,960.74
827.78
395,325.02
68,404.38
623,697.42
21,264.50
8,011,526.31
6,344,713.54
1,588.06
22,394,594.55
282,612.61
274,960,006.54
236,017.95
20,000.00
184,406.36
278,441,945.62
755,833.42
4,823,553.18
TOTAL 3620 948,659,375.40
* partial data
3ource: Inventory of the Vice Ministerio de Vivienda
with data from the Direccion de Registro de la Propi
Ministerio de justicia
TABLE 3.1
notes to Table 2
The inventory does not include:
The vast property portfolio of the municipal system.
The total of properties are not reported.
Properties with unclear legal status or occupied by other
institutions.
Land reserved for highway rights.
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revenues create a hurry-to-sell atmosphere, which could in turn,
deflate the real asset value.
2.52 The inventory value.
The reported value of 90,635,671 colones for the total amount of
real property owned by the government is extremely low. This
estimate is based in the following evidence:
This reported amount accounts for a value of
approximately 0.1 colon per square vara V2 . This price is
extremely undervalued considering that land in the countryside
goes from around 7 colones per V2 to 80 colones per V2 . Land in
the urban area of San Salvador is worth from 150 colones to 1000
colones per V2 . Taking, as a mean, a very conservative
assumption of 20 colones per V2 at market value, the total value
of the real property inventory value would be approximately
20,000,000,000 colones.
. This reported value is based on historical data that
is extremely low in relation to market prices - for some
properties 300 times less. A property in the inventory has a
reported a value of 1 colones V2 and a current market value of
300 colones.
. The eleven properties considered in the case study in
Chapter 5, are worth more than 3.7 billion colones. This sample
of properties is minuscule compared to the rest of the
properties in the metropolitan area of San Salvador alone, not
to mention the totality of the inventory which includes 3000
properties.
. In 1989, when the first estimates of the real estate
assets of the I.V.U. showed a value of 1000 million Colones in
assets, vacant land was worth 500 million colones. Mauricio
Stubig, Minister of Public Works, commented on this inventory:
"At the moment, the real property assets of each government
institution are being audited, we have realized that there are
properties that have an underutilized capacity and properties
that we never even thought were part of the patrimony of each
institution. In the case of IVU, for example, only with these
assets could we reactivate this institution in three years."
[Stubig]
2.53 The Inventory type.
Exhibit 3A highlights different types of GOES's real
property. Given the abscence of a real property inventory or
accurate data about size, use, and level of utilization, this
table is based on direct observation and research done at
various institutions.
Exhibit 3A GOES REAL PROPERTY PORTFOLIO
a. Vacant Land. This category includes vacant or underutilized
urban or rural raw land guarded on the perception that the
State needs to hold land for the day, when it may be
required for the Government's institutions or facilities to
expand. This category includes land such as:
Land reserved for future government expansion.
Land reserved parks or conservation areas.
Highway, train and air rights.
Leased land
b. Land occupied by squatters.
Land reserved for highway or trains rights.
Land reserved for future expansion overtaken
c. Buildings and land for governmnet entities.
Government headquarters,
administrative facilities,
support facilities, such as gas stations, mechanical
workshops, parking lots, cafeterias, electrical
services, cleaning service.
d. Buildings and land for non-administrative facilities. Some
types of properties in the GOES real estate portfolio are
to a large extent, dictated by the character of the
Government institutions primary activities).
dl. Transportation system facilities.
Airports, and related facilities
. Ports, and related facilities
. Highways related facilities and highway rigths.
Railroads, related facilities, and railroad rigths
d2. Financial Services facilities:
. bank headquarters and Branch offices.
. Bank holdings such as office; commercial, housing and
apartment space takenover to third parties.
d3. Service Facilities:
. Telecommunications, ANTEL
Hydroelectric plants CEL.
d4. Industrial property: These are properties which include
facilities with manufacturing or warehouse purposes.
Examples of this type of property in El Salvador are:
. Free Trade Industrial Zones ( Zonas francas).
. Plants for sugar production (Ingenios).
. Coffee production plants (Beneficios).
. A plant for the elaboration of Gasohol.
Grain Silos for IRA.
d7. Facilities for services.
Hotels. Hotel Presidente, 245 rooms. Hotel de
Montana.
National theaters. (Circuito de teatros Nacionales).
Cinemas, around 30 countrywide.
Stadiums, Parque de Pelota, Estadio Nacional.
International Fair, and sport facilities countrywide
Municipal market system.
Exhibit 3A
SUMMARY
The GOES privatization program involve different types of
initiatives. There are three basic objectives in the GOES
privatization initiatives: a) to eliminate functions that are a
drain to the fiscal deficit or could be executed by the private
sector; b) to liberalize assets; c) to dispose of real assets so
as to provide an alternative source of income for the
government, getting revenues as result of divestiture. In this
cases the consideration of real asset value is especially
important; and d) to provide land to squatters.
NOTES OF THE CHAPTER.
1 The past Christian Democrat government had an excessive
expansion in the 80's and assummed an interventionist role in
the productive sector of the economy. [Plan de desarrollo, 37].
Wisecarver in his book about the public sector of El Salvador in
1989 analyzed that through all its ingerence in the national
economy, the past government had achieved an economic system
that could just be compared with the one of a statized country
or in some sectors a socialized country. The quality of
spending /.../ together with the nature of its interventions
and regulations, (not to mention the attitudes and perspectives)
are the factors which weight more against the private sector in
the country and have destimulated economic and social
development. This threat must be overcome to reactivate the
salvadorean economy". [Wisecarver, 4].
2 There is a trend to reduce the government personnel, between
1984 and 1989, Employment in the public sector fell from 118,949
jobs to 111,418 [Wisecarver:15].
3 The definition of extreme poverty is refered to those
sectors of the general population whose income is lower or equal
to the cost of the "canasta basica" of food. In 1980 according
to CEPAL, half of the salvadorean population was under extreme
poverty conditions and up to 42.4% of the rest it almost did not
satisfy its food needs, housing, educational and otehrs. MIPLAN
data describe that in 1989 55% of the population was in
conditions of extreme poverty and in 1990 the percentage reached
63% [FUNDABAL, 2 ]
4 In the first months of 1991, the GOES anounced the creation of
the PESPP under the Instituto Libertad y Progreso (ILP), this is
a program that is within the PAE compensatory program. The
PESPP is a functional measure, aimed at modernizing the
government aparatus, that sticks to the liberal conception of
property that considers this one an absolute right. It pretends
to create quick mechanisms that make easier the legalization of
land. The beneficiaries are people that have been occupying
land that for legal reasons have not been able to legalize.
5 In 1976 a project of agrarian reform lasted for three months
and failed. In 1981 another agrarian reform took away from its
original owners 300,000 manzanas of land for agricultural
purposes, 12% of the agricultural land available in the country.
After this an intense debate followed trying to find the maximum
amount a person could have and it was defined at about 560
manzanas or 445 HA as stated above.
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CASE STUDIES.
This chapter evaluates case studies of the current GOES
privatization approach introduced in section 3.1. These case
studies are evaluated in contrast to the theoretical framework
proposed in Chapter 2.
This chapter poses the following question: Does the present
privatization evaluation approach, at both strategic and
tactical levels, consider the real asset value and the potential
for the highest and best use of the real property occupied by
entities/SOE's. It presents two case studies. The first
analyzes an ongoing privatization candidate. The second examines
three SOE candidates for privatization and other GOES entities
in their surroundings, demonstrating the rationale for a joint
evaluation of privatization candidates.
CASE STUDY 1: THE INSTITUTO SALVADORENO DE INVESTIGACIONES DEL
CAFE (ISIC)
Background.
The Instituto Salvadoreno De Investigaciones del Cafe
(ISIC) was a coffee research institution which serviced the
coffee producing community in El Salvador. The ISIC facilities
included 10.9 HA of land, 3000 m2 of administrative buildings,
laboratories, and experimental coffee plantations. These
facilities were located in a prime development area of Santa
Tecla. The ISIC was established in 1950, on a coffee
plantation. Now, after 30 years this non-intensive use facility
is surrounded by new residential development. The real property
has a market value estimated at 25 million colones by Direccion
General de Presupuesto (DGP) (General Budget Direcction). The
facilities are in a period of high obsolescence and high
deferred maintenance.
Current privatization situation.
In 1989 the GOES identified the ISIC as a candidate for
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privatization. This decision was based on the rationale that
the government was not going to execute activities that could be
run by the private sector. A key argument in taking such a
stance was that such an important institution (considering the
importance of coffee in El Salvador) should be kept apart from
political influences of any government. Based on the agreement
between the government and some coffee production sectors, the
institution was to be privatized and its function given to
PROCAFE which would represent the interests of all the coffee
producers.
A research study, Tropical Research, financed by USAID
developed a set of guidelines with steps to be implemented.
These guidelines stated that PROCAFE, the new entity, would
receive the existing land, installations and equipment. The
research concluded the land should be sold to the new research
institution. Therefore the government, in an arrangement with
USAID was going to make a donation in land, facilities and
equipment totalling 1.8 million dollars (market value of those
facilities lay mostly in land accounting for 3.2 million
dollars). This transaction did not preclude the new institution
from later selling the land and relocating.
A second research group was consulted in order to value the
ISIC's fixed assets and to study possible legal mechanisms for
the transference of the assets to the new entity. However this
property was mentioned in a paper [FUSADES, July 1990] as having
potential for alternative uses, and for this reason the author
was called upon as consultant for this second research project.
The second research group proposed an alternative scheme. The
new research determined that the current location of ISIC was
not viable, for the following reasons:
a. From the legal standpoint, the property was owned by
the GOES, not the ISIC as thought before. Therefore there was
no obligation to donate any land or installations to PROCAFE.
b. From the technical standpoint, research installations
and plantations should be able to reproduce the conditions of
coffee plantations in the countryside. The urban setting would
make it difficult such conditions. The setting would incur
noise and smog, which would even affect the measurements of the
laboratory equipment.
c. From the operational standpoint, a highway that had
been scheduled to be built in the north side of the plot would
separate the laboratories from the coffee research plantations,
which would make the research less feasible.
d. From an economic stanpoint, the land was being under-
valued. A later valuation estimated the value at 25 million
colones. At such value, the land was too expensive having in
mind its use for coffee plantations. Tropical Research had not
considered the possibility of giving the property an alternative
use and relocating the existing facilities. A highest and best
use analysis showed potential for residential developments. The
inclusion of a new highway passing through the land would
increase its real asset value.
The recommendation suggested and interim lease and
relocation of the new entity PROCAFE in about foru or five
years. This recommendation raises two issues:
a. The new institution leases the land for a limited
amount of time. After four or five years the new institution
relocates. This would give sufficient time for experimental
coffee trees to start growing, meanwhile not losing the existing
research. The cost of this relocation should be part of the new
institution's concerns.
b. The new uses for the land and buildings have not yet
been determined yet. Such uses could range from creating a
park and mixed recreational and residential developments, to the
construction of the Agriculture Ministry headquarters.
The fact that the Tropical Research study results were
addopted, reflected in the first GOES policy to not consider the
option of relocation. This resulted in a costly mistake, since
the GOES compromised by donating 1.98 million dollars -- the
assumed value of the installations and land which were thought
to belong to ISIC. Under different conclusions the money for
the new entity could likely have come from a the donation
agency, USAID. However since this compromise was taken, USAID
found that it hard to justify spending more money on the
project. Hence the GOES had to find the money from its own
sources. The new research institute has to get the funds from
sources excluding the GOES or USAID.
Regardless of the costs, the real property will most likely
achieve a higher and best use. The real asset value of the land
was considered and it was estimated at almost 3.2 million
dollars, which would have been lost if the land had been
considered agricultural land subsidized for the new private
research institution.
This case has demonstrated a scenario where the property
occupied by an SOE was located in a.prime development area, with
potential for a higher and better use over the current one. The
Tropical Research scheme, based in the current approach to
privatization, did not identify these characteristics, resulting
in the real asset value not being recognized.
In the second approach the different characteristics of the
property were analyzed, resulting in the feasibility of
relocating the institution and using the current facilities in
five years either for sale or for other government uses.
CASE STUDY 2. SAN BENITO AREA GOES SOE'S/ENTITIES REAL PROPERTY
PORTFOLIO
This case examines three SOEs which have been identified by
the GOES as potential candidates for privatization mentioned in
section 3.2: the FIES, the Lechuza tube factory, and the
Presidente Hotel.
The three enterprises share in common the following facts:
that they have more potential as alternative real property uses
than their ongoing uses; they could be privatized as active
enterprises and according to their real property value; they
represent little or no social impact if privatized or divested;
they are both economically and physically obsolete; and they are
at adjacent locations in the same prime development area of the
city. The latter characteristic allows the possibility of
analyzing the real property of these SOEs jointly and/or in
conjunction with other government properties in the area. The
common location is a common phenomenon in government
institutitons. In these locations the GOES has developed
SOE's/entities unrelated in their products. The adjacency of
these properties, however, makes the evaluation of their joint
real property characteristics essential for the achievement of
the real asset value. The government assembles a big piece of
land, and in time, surrounding development add to its value.
The fact that this proposed type of evaluation is not
considered in the GOES current privatization analysis is based
on three facts: there is not an overall vision in the analysis
of SOEs; the real asset value is not considered; and the
analysis has been done basically in isolation as a result of the
current loose privatization scheme (see section 5.7).
All these enterprises currently share the similar financial
losses (or breakeven) versus a high opporutunity cost of the
real estate they occupy.
The latter privatization candidates call for the attention
of this study since they involve enterprises of particular
interest from a real property management perspective for the
following reasons: a) the economic life of their real estate has
been surpassed; b) the current use is not the highest and best
use; c) the market value has increased markedly; and the use
value is low and prospects of exchange are good.
The case study includes the following: it first introduces
the area and its changing dynamics; second, it studies each
individual SOE and the current efforts towards its
privatization; third, it analyzes their real property
characteristics and the argument for change of use; fourth, it
examines the foregone opportunities if these candidates are
evaluated in isolation and as ongoing enterprises as it would
occur under the GOES current privatization scheme. It then
examines advantages, if any, of a joint analysis of these SOEs
based on their adjacent real estate.
4.21 Description of the San Benito Area:
The San Benito area is located to the southwest of the San
Salvador Metropolitan Area (AMSS) (see map 1 ) and it is the
prime development area in the city. It has one of the best
infrastructures in the AMSS. For a description of the area see
Appendix. The sources for this information have been Direcci6n
de Catastro Fiscal for prices of land; Instituto Geogrdfico
Nacional and Oficina de Planificaci6n del Area Metropolitana,
for maps, or on site information when feasible.
The San Benito infrastructure was designed in the 50's to
be the Government Center of the AMSS. However, the proposed
location of the Government Center was switched to the Finca
Modelo where it currently stands. This arrangement gave rise to
the San Benito residential area. However, the infrastructure
for the Government Center had already been built, and included
wide boulevards, and monuments. It became an area of residential
houses and monuments, both of beautiful architecture.
The GOES kept at that time, an extensive part of the area,
and bought at very low price the golf courses of the El Salvador
Country Club with more than 60 HA. Given the suburban
characteristics of the area at that time, the government gave
these lots to non-intensive-space-use institutions mentioned in
the cases studies and others mentioned in the Appendix 4.1.
The land and facilities used for institutional purposes
have now acquired a great potential for other uses. Given the
change of the area in the 80's most of its residential use
became to commercial/office/apartment space. This intensified
use of space and new developments in the area engulfed the
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public sector facilities, creating non-intensive-use pockets.
This creates incompatibility with the trend for growth in the
area. Some government institutions disrupt the normal growth and
behavior of the surrounding areas. For example, there are
various institutions that are no longer compatible with the
area, such as military installations (see page Appendix 4.1).
The increasing demand for commercial and office space in
the area has provoked the following:
a. Space intensification and changing uses of the
existing large residences in the area. The construction area
ranges from 400M to 2000 M2 and the land plots are of 2000 M2 or
higher. There are residences in the area abandoned by owners
who fled the country because of the war.
b. In the last two years as old space became less
available, thousands of square meters of space were built and
projected in the area. New buildings such as the Zona Rosa (the
largest concentration of restaurants, cafes, and clubs in the
AMSS), Torre Democracia, three new shopping malls, banks, and
corporate headquarters, are examples of such projects.
c. Increasing land values. The land in this area is now
one of the most valuable of the country. Land prices range
from 450 to 1000 colones per square meter (1 vara is 0.8301
meters) or 50 to a 130 dollars per square meter (according to
data in the Banco Hipotecario, Direccion de Catastro Fiscal, and
real estate sources). According to the Direccion de Catastro
Fiscal, land prices in the area have grown in value from 80 to
700 Colones in ten years.
Among the forces that provoked this increasing -demand in
the area and which also changed the patterns of development of
the AMSS were:
a. The civil war which started in 1979, provoked a major
move of institutions/corporations to the area. This area has
been defined as "most secure" by foreign entities, embassies,
and corporate headquarters. The already high standard of living
in the area has increased, creating a demand for
commercial/office space.
b. Residential influx in the city because of migration.
and the growth of population in the surrounding areas. This was
originated by the development of the area of approximately five
kilometers between San Salvador and Nueva San Salvador. Nueva
San Salvador itself has grown from 100,000 to 400,000
inhabitants in six years. This area, known as Ciudad Merliot,
is a middle class and working class neighborhood with existing
industrial/service facilities. There are no official figures on
this growth because due to the lack of a census.
c. The 1986 earthquake, destroyed or damaged a major
portion of the public-sector infrastructure provoking a move of
the banks' headquarters and public and private offices, from
downtown to San Benito.
4.22 Hotel Presidente Complex and land for expansion.
The Presidente Hotel was created by the government in 1976
based on the expectation of expanding tourism. The management of
this state hotel was leased to the Hyatt Regency. Given the
drop in tourism at the start of the civil war, in 1980 Hyatt
stopped operating the hotel. The hotel facilities were passed
on to CORSAIN, the Government entity in charge of the
management and now in charge of the prospects of privatization.
The Hotel was the government's first candidate for
privatization. There have been attempts to privatize the Hotel
since 1985 with no substantial offers, according to the CORSAIN
management. An offer made in 1989 for 35 million colones was
rejected because it was considered too low. The real estate
profile and criteria for evaluation are presented in Exhibit
4.1.
Current privatization situation:
The decision-making process regarding this hotel has always
been based on the expectation that if tourism expands in the
country this major hotel will be necessary. Therefore the GOES
should not sell it for another use. This has led to lost
Hotel Presidente profile.
Land size. 25,692 M2 for the lot occupied by the Hotel
complex and 20,701 M2 for a lot of adjacent reserve land.
Facilities. The facilities built in 1976 occupy 16,300 M2
and a construction value of 2,500 colones per square meter.
The facilities are well built; high deferred maintenance.
Market values. Because of the area characteristics, the
price goes from around 500 to 700 Colones per V2 . Being the
hotel and facilities valued in 1989 at 54,000,000 colones
based in replacement cost. Estimated market value of 70
million colones [1989 valuation].
Under-utilization. - The hotel maintains a 35% occupancy,
remaining 65% vacant most of the year [1989].
Financial situation. The state has carried losses
operating this hotel for almost ten years. Such losses
have resulted from a high vacancy rate, under-utilization,
and obsolescence. The government renovated and the hotel
to make it more attractive, but the investment has not
proven effective. This reflects the lack of consideration
to the evaluation of the investment costs vis-a-vis the
potential revenues in public investment.
Use-value/exchange-value tradeoff. This hotel has a use
value for the governmnet of 685 colones based on NPV/m2,
which contrasts with the exchange value of 2,300 colones.
The Hotel had an expected life of 40 years but has gone
into deferred replacement since there are almost no
revenues.
EXHIBIT 4.1
opportunities. In 1989 there was high vacancy rate at the
hotel and the increase of demand in the area for apartment and
office space was high (a consequence of the 1986 earthquake and
the continuation of the war). At that moment a research study
estimated that the hotel could be partially converted to another
use, remodeling and using its second floor for office space at
a very low cost. However, CORSAIN did not take advantage of the
opportunity. Another alternative could have been to convert
the hotel to office space and condos, with a club and a
convention center in the common facilities. This follows the
rationale that at that particular moment it was better to divest
the property to a potential buyer who had other objective than
the hotel in mind. However there is a bias towards keeping the
ongoing uses, which has resulted in the continuation of losses
and the lack of consideration to the real asset value (see
section 2.2 Guidelines). If the market forces were left to flow
freely they would identify when a major hotel was necessary
again, but in the meantime both the state and the development
sector would have benefitted from an unbiased policy of
privatization. The state would then have benefitted from the
potential income coming from this operation and would have saved
financial resources by means of credits of the nationalized bank
system to build new facilities by increasing the offer of space
in the area.
4.23 La Lechuza, Tube Factory.
Current privatization situation:
La Lechuza is a factory for the production of concrete
tubes, owned by the Ministry of Public Works (MOP) and used by
the Direccion General De Urbanismo y Arquitectura (DUA). The
factory was considered by DUA as a potential candidate for
privatization as an ongoing-use. However this matter has not
been pursued because the factory does not report losses and the
State would have to find an interested buyer that would like to
invest. The Lechuza facilities are obsolete. If the price of
land reflects the real asset value, then a privately operated
tube factory would not be profitable here. Because of its
location, the real estate has a potential for various higher and
better uses. It would be worth considering the possibility of
relocating the factory. The real estate profile and criteria for
evaluation are presented in Exhibit 4.3
La Lechuza, profile
. Land Size the lot is 49,719 M2 (71,159 V2)
. Land values. Because of its land characteristics, 60% of
the property is a river depression, the land value is lower
than the surrounding areas, being worth around 400 per m2.
This also given the necessary infrastructure and the land
filling necessary to develop the property
. Age. Most facilities were built in the 60's.
. Legal status. The land is disputed between the FIES, who
paid 300,000 colones for a plot worth 35 million, and DUA.
. Use value-exchange value tradeoff. The Lechuza has a use
value for the government of 6.60 colones based on NPV/m2
which contrasts with the exchange value of 752 colones.
. Degree of obsolescence. The facilities are of temporary
type, with a high deferred maintenance.
Under-utilization. The tube factory is barely used, a
plant for the elaboration of asphalt for highways is not
used.
Relation to city growth. The Lechuza is the only place by
which the FIES can directly communicate its central section
and the San Benito area (see map) . The facility is
surrounded by housing to the north, the international Fair
to the south and the Pan American Highway to the east.
There is demand in the surroundings for commercial/office/
apartment space.
Feasibility of relocation. The facilities used by the IVU
could easily be relocated according to Architect Bara,
President of IVU. The asphalt plant is obsolete because of
the construction of another plant with higher capacity.
Low social impact. The relocation would only affect the
staff (20 men) working in the tube factory.
EXHIBIT 4.2
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4.24 La Feria Internacional De El Salvador (FIES)
The Feria Internacional de El Salvador (FIES), is an
Autonomous institution that inaugurated in 1965. It operates
under the Ministry of Economy. The intrinsic nature of the FIES
is to rent its facilities to commercial representatives of
foreign governments or to local firms. The FIES host a major
export-import events the Feria Internacional de El Salvador once
every two years. The real estate profile and criteria for
evaluation are presented in Exhibit 4.3
The possibility for the FIES to become a privatization
candidate was first publically proposed by the Minister of
Economy in mid 1990 in a TV interview. The minister proposed an
ongoing enterprise. The FIES was also suggested by a FUSADES
study to be privatized as an alternative use. The FIES falls
under the redefinition of government objectives. What would
happen if the FIES were privatized, and how would the
consideration of the prime location of its real property and
its real asset value affects the privatization evaluation?
The FIES is an SOE that occupies a large, very valuable,
extremely underutilized, prime piece of real estate which has
potential for a highest and best use. In order to keep the FIES
operating the government must ignore the high opportunity cost
of holding the facilities for current use and therefore the real
asset value; the subsidies to the FIES in form of free space;
and the acceptance of poor outcomes for social or financial
reasons.
Feasible strategy scenarios for the FIES.
The government should consider various alternatives based on the
privatization methods presented in chapter one and the criteria
that could be gathered form the real asset management
experience.
To keep the current use in which case, the GOES would not
acknowledge the real asset value.
To intensify the use of the FIES.
Feria Internacional de El Salvador (FIES) profile.
Land size and value. This property occupies an area of
210,000 m2 (286,123 v2 ) . The value has increased from 100 to 700
colones per m2 in ten years [DCC] . Market value if facilities
were sold, is estimated at 186,000,000, adding to 156,000,000
for the land and 30,000,000 for the facilities (depreciated 50%)
The parking lot of the FIES is approximately 41000 square
meters, valued at approximately 600 colones per square meter, a
total market value of approximately 25 million colones. The
parking lot can accommodate 2000 vehicles and most of the year
it is not used except for sporadic events at the FIES, or for
soccer games over the weekend. This property has been and under
increased pressure to change its current use, therefore there is
a possibility of leaving the FIES without a parking lot. The MAG
has though of putting some of its facilities there. A project
was designed there also, to relocate all the government
institutions into two 32 floor towers after the destruction of
the 1986 earthquake on GOES installations in government center.
There is a trend to analyze this property aside form the FIES.
Facilities size: The FIES installations have 40000 m2 of
constructed facilities worth approximately around 1500
colones/m2 . Most facilities were built between 1964 and 1976.
The FIES is composed of 50 exhibition facilities and warehouses.
Many facilities were built having a high churning rate in mind
so they have a flexible design and non-permanent character. The
buildings are one floor, except for the main pavilion which is
of 10,000 square meters and has a mezzanine.
Dynamics of change of the site. Given the rapid changing
pace of commercial activity in the area (explained above) and
its strategic location in the center of the physical growth of
the AMSS, the FIES is a case which offers various alternatives
for analysis. The current FIES facilities are located on the Pan
American Highway, the main communication line in Central
America. The subject site is well located in relation to other
public facilities and support services. Given the pattern of
market demand in the area the of FIES, the highest and best use
for this lot is a mix of commercial, office and housing space.
Legal status. The land is owned by the Ministry of
Agriculture and is leased at no charge to the FIES. However,
the 50 year lease which was offered in 1965 has not yet been
signed. Until 1990 the high-level MAG officials neither know
that the property belonged to the Ministry, nor were they aware
of the status of ownership of the facilities that have been
built in this area as was shown by this research. Nevertheless
the perception of government officials is that the property
belongs to the FIES. This is a situation present in most SOEs of
the GOES (same case as ISIC) . The parking lot of the FIES,
located south of the International Fair, belongs as well to the
MAG but it has not been acnowledged that it is included in the
unsigned lease. This presents demands by various GOES entities
and developers. for changing the use of this apparenly vacant
real estate
The rationale to privatize for alternative uses or for
assigning the real property a different use comes about because
of the following factors:
Use value-exchange value tradeoff. The FIES has a a
use value for the government of 18.9 colones based on NPV/m 2
which contrasts with the Exchange value of 1108 colones. Some
installations had an expected life of 30 years but has been
going into deferred maintenance, since there are almost no
revenues. Many facilities are of the warehouse type.
Outputs. The revenues are 300,000 colones every two
years. The FIES experiences revenues one year and losses in the
next.
Need for rehabilitation. The facilities have growing
obsolescence and high deferred maintenance in addition to a
physical and economic obsolescence. Last year the FIES invested
4,000,000 colones in repairing for the event.
The high degree of deferred replacement and the
reduced output indicates that the FIES is at a declining stage
in its real property cycle.
Subsidized Space. Both the GOES and the FIES management
agree that the institution could run perfectly under the private
sector. However, when presented to the current management, the
consideration that if, as a private buyer the new entity should
have to pay at "fair market value" for the land and facilities,
this idea is questioned. The question that arises is: should
the GOES subsidize the continuation of the event by means of
free land and facilities, or keep a lost opportunities by
ignoring the high opportunity cost of the real property. In 25
years the FIES has paid no rent for the land and it has reported
little benefits income. The scenario of free-land-subsidies to
the FIES is treated in section 5.4
Current usage. The FIES has undergone profound
changes and transformations in nature and uses in 25 years due
to external or political circumstances.
High degree of under-utilization. Under-utilization of
space shows that:
The need for the FIES as an event is decreasing. The time
span between each fair has increased from one year to a two
year and the duration of the FIES from 25 days to 13 days.
In the meantime it has housed events far from the FIES
initial objectives ranging from trading events (highly
criticised) to cattle exhibitions.
The under-utilization of space on the FIES makes the FIES
installations attractive to other GOES institutions which
are continuosly pressuring to get space. The FIES
facilities have been increasingly occupied temporarily or
permanently by its strong neighbor the Estado Mayor, which
has already definitely taken over some facilities .
* to host extraordinary events such as: being a facility
for the Consejo Central de Elecciones (central body
that organizes the elections in el salvador),
* Hosting government institutions such as the Ministerio
de Hacienda and Ministerio del Interior affected by
the 1986 earthquake.
* A permanent site for the San Benito battalion 1
Changes on space dynamics. The FIES management acknowledges
that the FIES event will tend to disappear and that the trend is
going toward more specialized events 2 which implies a
contraction in the need for space of the FIES. The current use
yof the FIES to host artistic events and official ceremonies may
end with the reconstruction of the national gymnasium (with a
capacity to accommodate 15000 persons) which was where these
events were held, before the 1986 earthquake.
Externalities and Incompatibility. The FIES installations
which constitute a source of disruption for the area when events
take place. Approximatelly a million visitors go to the fair
during the peak time span which last 17 days; informal commerce
surrounds the FIES and traffic jams in the surrounding streets.
This situation is intolerable to the neighbors. On the other
hand the normally unused facilities restrain the demand for
growth of the area.
Loss of initial objectives.The stated objective of the FIES
have increasingly been lost. The chamber of Commerce (Camara de
Comercio), in an article strongly criticized the FIES getting
away from its original objective, becoming:
a) A place where occasional entrepreneurs perform illicit
competition through the smuggle of goods, transforming the
FIES into an enemy of free competition.
b) A festive-amusing activity of a domestic character.
c) A very expensive promotional means of the State
bureaucracy.
The FIES represents the interests of a limited group of the
import and export sector of the country and could be perfectly
operated by this sector.
EXHIBIT 4.3
The best alternative is to lease either totally or
partially (by phasing). And to relocate the function into other
area.
Finally, some recommendations in the case of a FIES
privatization scenario are the following:
An examination of the area where the FIES and other
privatization candidates are located permits to identify a level
of complementarity which taken into consideration would enhance
their real asset value.
The following are some of the different alternatives that
could be proposed for the FIES:
a. To continue operations without improving the property.
It has the disadvantage of opportunities foregone for susidizing
a function that could be provided by the private sector.
b. Total Divestiture of the FIES as it is. It has the
advantages of changing the usage of under utilized resources to
a higher and better use and generating revenues to the state.
It has the disadvantage of producing the lowest possible profit
in the liquidation.
c. To dispose of the real property in parts. This option
has the advantage of distribute in a time span the divestiture.
This permits the government to keep operation of the FIES while
permiting the potentail appreciation of the different phases of
the development.
d. Leasehold for a fixed amount of time. This
alternative has the advantage of distributing the potential
income over a span of time while keeping the property of the
land and future improvements.
e. A joint development of the state and the private
enterprise. The state provides the land as its equity and the
private enterprise deveops the site to a new use. The
government participates of the revenues and potential
appreciation on the land.
f. To privatize the enterprise transfering the
management. Has the disadvantage of keep running an obsolete
function and not giving the property its highest and best use.
Based on these alternatives, which did not pretend neither
to be exhaustive, a study could suggest for example, a
privatization method that suggests a joint enterprise
government-private sector. Which intensifies the use of the
FIES, keeping some space for the future. While developing the
rest for a mixed use development with a private developer. The
area for development which could be the middle area and the area
of la Lechuza, could be acssessed from San Benito by
communicating the dead end of a Av. Las Palmas in the San
Benito. This could be the first phase of the development. Then
if successful the FIES could be either relocated totally to an
area such as the new airport.
This- would imply:
1. It is feasible to relocate the FIES to an area (for
example, near the International Airport as suggested by the FIES
president). This would require buses for transportation to the
area in the days of the event. This alternative has been tried
successfully in the past. The first FIES events had to have
special lines to the event. In its beginning the Fair was
served by these kind of public transportation since it was in
the suburbs.
It would put a center of development for that area, such as
the hotels, zonas francas, and other facilities being built
there which have more to see with export import. A permanent
event of El Salvador export inventory as suggested by FUSADES
and the Chamber of Commerce would be a subject for further
analysis.
The possibility of a space use intensification in order to
leave the FIES in the area (subjected to a benefit cost
analysis) but permit area for development. If the space is
subsidized and use less.
The development of housing projects, (for the poor as well
as markets.) the squatters provide labor for the surrounding
places)
Given the degree of complementarity (see section 2.26)
among the FIES and other GOES properties, the development for
the FIES should consider a joint development with other GOES
properties in the area.
The Lechuza which surrounds the FIES to the west and south
gives possibilities of access from other areas of the city.
To include the Handicraft market which now consists of 36
stores and a plot of approximately 2000 V2 located between the
FIES and La lechuza. It runs under the ministry of Economy and
leases its stores at low prices. This area has been identified
by the municipality for the development of a marketplace which
would serve the west part of the city. A new approach with the
private enterprise could be tried to develop such a marketplace.
(there have been precedents of development of such kind.
Marketplace Hula Hula, to be developed by Jimenez Castillo
Arquitectos.)
Any privatization/divestment initiative in the area should
take into consideration that its results would be improved if
the military facilities were relocated to outside of the city '.
The relocation of military installations outside the city has
been proposed in the past by the GOES before and it appears more
feasible because the war is likely to end. This scenario would
increase the existing demand on the area, with the resultant of
an increase in market values in which the government as a major
owner of the land in the area would benefit. If military
authorities were presented a benefit cost analysis of the
relocation, acceptance might be likely since the land is worth
millions which could be devoted to built new facilities. The
present military installations are technically obsolete and are
incompatible with the rest of the area (see appendix 4.1).
This case study has illustrated issues and possibilities
vs current considerations. A benefit cost analysis of the
strategies is outside the scope of this thesis.
SUMMARY.
The case studies presented evidence that the alternative
focus for privatization analysis proposed in chapter 2 is
important to be considered in the analysis of potential
candidates. The current GOES privatization evaluation, does
not identify at hand feasible candidates which could be
relocated and exploited for their real estate potential.
. It ignores the opportunity cost to the GOES in
subsidies for free land to institutions. Especially if they
favor a reduced group of enterprises
. The existence of misconceptions and incorrect
procedures threaten the current privatization effort because it
is too restrictive and fails to realize the real property
characteristics of the candidates.
. The GOES Privatization process does not evaluate real
property potential for alternative uses which nor takes
advantage of the ever changing real estate conditions.
NOTES OF THE CHAPTER
1 An area of the FIES has served to host for the past ten
years the San Benito battalion. The Ministry of Defense had also
overtook definitely the old parking lot of the FIES to built its
permanent facilities for the Instituto de Transmisiones de la
Fuerza Armada.
2 The fair is an institution that is in a period of
evolution. The manager of the FIES, Mr.Maximiliano Figueroa as
well as the Chamber of Commerce of El Salvador, predict that the
Fair is going to be transformed into a place where specialized
exhibitions will be hosted. This would involve the reduction on
the need for space.
3 The military installations, established a long time ago in
the east of the subject study area were planned to move out of
the city. Some areas at the nearby Espino Hacienda, were
designated for the use of the military, and this is known as a
military development known as the "Hexagono" . 7 years after this
plan was proposed, just one military installation has been built
in the area. A factor that might lessen the influence of the
negative influence military installations is the increased
prospects for a dialogue and an end to the conflict.
THE PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM APPRAISSAL:
THE CONSIDERATION OF THE REAL ASSET VALUE
This chapter is an appraissal of the different privatization
initiatives presented in chapter 3. It follows the guidelines
drawn in section 2.3. It evaluates technical and political
issues preventing consideration of SOEs' real property real
asset value at least in the short term.
5.1 REVISE THE NEED FOR THE PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM.
The GOES privatization program has placed little emphasis
on income generation via real property divestiture.
Divestiture via real property was not considered when the GOES
PAE was conceived. The PAE considered generation of revenues via
higher taxation exclusively. In this regard Wisecarver
recommended.
"That given the level of economic and social development of
El Salvador aiming at achieving a reduction of public
spending via cuts on physical and human capital ... Does
this constitute a responsible policy? If the answer is no,
... the imperative and urgent necessity of achieving a
higher tributary collection, is therefore magnified. It
looks like El Salvador does not have another option."
[Wisecarver, 38].
Wisecarver's recommendation influenced the GOES's
willingness to consider other sources of income generation
besides tributary collection. It discouraged cuts in real
property, therefore eliminating both the possibility of revenue
generation via real property and the incentive to consider real
asset value.
Wisecarver's recommendation contrasts with FUSADE's 1990
proposal to the GOES which advocated the use of real property as
an alternative source of income generation. The basis for
FUSADES claims were the high opportunity cost of holding idle
real property resources; and the non-optimal utilization of real
property in prime locations. This was the first document in El
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Salvador to urge consideration of real asset value in
privatization analysis.
The GOES aspires to be self-sufficient. The government
relies on foreign aid as a source of revenue. However, the aid
is in danger of being withdrawn. This creates pressure on the
GOES to generate revenues, not only by taxation, but to use its
own resources. After ten years, however, the government is
overconfident given its dependency on foreign aid. There is no
awareness of the increased prospects of an eventual pull back of
foreign aid. This was acknowledged, in a private interview, high
ranking official of a foreign aid agency, who stated that
neither the government nor private enterprise show signs of
understanding that in a short time foreign aid will be reduced
significantly.
The government has previously chosen to ignore real
property divestiture; however, this solution is presently
gaining momentum. Exploiting the GOES own resources would mean
,putting the assets to their highest and best use. However,
certain political and technical circumstances preclude this
situation. This can be apreciated in various elements of their
approach to the gathering of an inventory.
The emphasis here should be switched from the exclusive
concern for the reduction of both the fiscal deficit and the
size of the state, to the achievement of the highest and best
use for government resources. There is a vast, idle RPP
integrated by properties that are underutilized, undervalued, or
surplus to any government need. As it stands now, the GOES's
institutional real property occupies 4% of the national
territory which is kept mostly vacant (not considering forest
reserves or highway rights).
The lack of analysis of the real property potential might
be based on the fact that Wisecarver's research was done before
the current inventory. The only inventory available at the time
was the Direccion de Contabilidad Central's (DCC) which conveyed
a small real property inventory that is analyzed in section 5.8.
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5.2 THE DEFINITION OF OBJECTIVES.
There is not a clear understanding nor a clear definition
of objectives, and perceptions in the current privatization
program. The definition of clear objectives is of much
importance because, "the choice of privatization or divestiture
techniques is generally a function of government objectives, the
SOE's/entity/asset condition, its sector of activity and the
country characteristics."
In El Salvador, the current trend is to evaluate activities
exclusively based on the objective to reduce the fiscal deficit
and to reduce the size of the state.
As mentioned above each program's objectives must be
adapted to the special needs of each country. In this particular
case it makes sense at the moment to look for candidates that
following the objectives mentioned above could generate
alternative sources of income for the government. This given the
fact that in the transition of the restructuring/adjustment
program the maximization of liquidation revenues and the
intensification of the use of space by means of physical size
reductions, fixed capital losses, might prove to be very
effective in generating alternative sources of income. Then as
the program begins to be implemented, increased productivity and
economic growth could turn out to be more important objectives
than short term deficit reduction and revenue generation.
In the GOES privatization scheme, sectorial interests tend
to prevail over the overall vision, given the fact that there
are different perceptions of the government officials involved
in privatization evaluation. The interests of sectoral parties
may prevail over the GOES objectives. This affects the
evaluation of alternative uses of the real property held by
SOE's, because inside parties tend to retain current usage.
Input information for privatization analysis comes from upper
and middle management within the SOEs/entities which are
candidates for privatization. Therefore, management influences
potential solutions, even if privatization efforts originate at
a high level. For instance, previous ISIC privatization
research (see case study 4.1) was done taking into consideration
the PROCAFE and ISIC interests. From the MAG perception it was
better to keep property either for a posterior sale or to build
its new facilities. From the GOES perception it might be better
if as result of divestment the income resulting from the sale of
the land could contribute to the GOES social programs.
The divestiture of the military facilities in the San
Benito area would most likely increase the prices of land in the
area which is mostly owned by the government. However,
regardless of the benefits to society of eliminating an
uncompatible use in the area and the feasibility of relocation
of these facilities. No action could be expected since there is
not a centralized decision making that could persuade the
military to relocate.
5.3 THE PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT PROCESS
The overall privatization process has been poorly planned
and managed since its announcement. The plan lacks clearly
defined objectives, results and transparency consequently
increasing potential opposition and endangering the process.
The privatization process has been implemented slowly.
The first privatization candidates have not been
successfully privatized in the eyes of the public. The
Instituto Regulador de Alimentos (IRA), for example, was
liquidated based on the rationale that it had not been operating
for five years, draining 120 million colones from the budget.
The IRA was accused of buying agricultural commodities high and
selling low in addition to corrupt operation. However, the
institution had a "popular image", which was tarnished by the
opponents of the privatization program. They presented
arguments ranging from unemployment (even if the benefits to
employees equaled a year's salary) to rising food prices.
Consequently, the opponents of the privatization program
created an adverse atmosphere for the IRA liquidation. There was
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a strong public debate, union strikes, and even threats by some
U.S congressmen to cut the U.S economic aid if the IRA case was
processed. As a result of these pressures, the Minister of
Agriculture was called before the National Assembly to clarify
the legality of the IRA liquidation. Some government officials
avoided responsibility by not taking sides on this issue and
saying the central government did not know whether this
liquidation was legal. The IRA liquidation proved extremely
unsuccessful at gaining popular support for the privatization
program. Before proceeding with the liquidation of IRA the GOES
should have successfully privatized the other candidates.
However, the GOES's first candidates have not been successfully
privatized because of both low of viability and the
aforementioned pressures.
The IRA controversy provoked hesitation by the GOES on how
to proceed with the privatization program. President Cristiani
stated to the nation in a televised speech that no further
liquidation of institutions would be made. Cristiani stated
that the privatization program would issue and sell shares of
public enterprises and banks. The exclusive consideration of
this method prevents SOE's real property achieving real asset
value (as is further explored in section 5.4).
The government has dealt with the privatization program
from a purely philosophical perspective. This standpoint
contrasts with chapter one, which recommends turning to the real
issues focusing in aspects such as the satisfactions foregone
for holding under utilized property, the necessities of
investment in other areas, and the real cost of subsidizing
obsolete enterprisese by means of free space.
The lack of a concerted, well-planned effort is hurting the
privatization program.
Other privatization candidate cases that have been
problematic in terms of showing success are:
a. In 1986, disposition of municipal land reserved for
parks to private developers --some with connections to the
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ruling political party-- created apprehension on the community
against the Government as land seller. These land dispositions
were condemned by most citizens thus impacted negatively on the
privatization effort. The action created a bad precedent for any
governmental action involving the disposition of land to third
parties. The municipality made little profit. Land was sold
at its original value, which was sometimes 300 times less than
the market price. The under-priced transactions were revised
and the land re-nationalized. The latter does not create a good
environment for investment by the private sector before the fear
of re-nationalization, influencing negatively the choice of
methods.
b. The Presidente Hotel (see case 4.2) was the first
property targeted for privatization. This was an obvious choice
since governments should not be involved in a hotel business
[Cristiani]. After six years on the market, the hotel has not
yet been sold. Reasons range from insufficient efforts the
government to the lack of a market for hotel real estate.
The privatization decision-making process regarding this
hotel has always been based on the expectation that if tourism
expands in the country this major hotel will be necessary.
Therefore the GOES should not dispose it for another use. This
has led to lost opportunities. In 1989, for example, there was
short demand for hotel (65% vacancy rate) and the demand for
apartment and office space in the area was high (see section
4.2). (A consequence of the 1986 earthquake and the continuation
of the war). A research study at the time estimated that the
hotel's second floor could be remodelled and converted to office
space. However, CORSAIN did not take advantage of the
opportunity. The hotel could have been converted to office
space and condos, with a club and convention center in the
common facilities. At the time, it was more feasible to divest
the property to a potential buyer who had in mind converting the
hotel to whatever the market required.
There is a bias towards maintaining ongoing uses (as
mentioned in section 2.27). This bias affects the free flow of
market forces that would otherwise identify the rigth moment for
building again a major hotel. Meanwhile possible benefits to
the state from changing hotel uses could have included the
following: a) revenue generation; b) avoided operation losses;
and c) finance other necessary activities with funds from the
nationalized bank system, which were used to finance increasing
space offer in the San Benito area. The later has resulted in
surplus space in the area and lowered market values of real
property.
5.4 THE ELIMINATION OF DISTORTIONS
The GOES must decide whether core and noncore enterprises
will be sold, liquidated, or rehabilitated. This would result in
the SOEs fending for themselves, clarifying their true
situation. This should be achieved by eliminating subsidies or
new public investments. The privatization program distortions
are the following:
5.41 Opportunity Cost.
The current privatization program lacks consideration to
the enormous opportunity cost caused by holding the GOES idle
portfolio. This is negative:
a. In view of the country's major social and economic
goals, the first priority should be the execution of socially
desirable projects and/or the rehabilitation of the deteriorated
infrastructure. At a time when expenses are steep, funds
scarce, and austerity encouraged, the Government cannot afford
the luxury of holding excess real property. Otherwise this cost
is transferred to the taxpayers, either through higher
government services costs or by essential societal services
foregone.
b. It limits private sector access to vacant or under-
utilized properties that otherwise could be used more
efficiently than by the Government. The static management of
the idle RPP signifies a poor utilization of the country's
resources. This results in a high opportunity cost for the
economy, especially in light of the existing demand on these
resources by the private sector. This contradicts the GOES
postulates as stated in section 3.1 In the past, real property
assets have been accumulated without regard to the GOES needs.
This was not obvious in the past but in difficult times
institutions tend to look at existing resources.
5.42 Space Subsidies.
The current privatization program does not account for the
opportunity cost of subsidies given in the form of free space or
subsidized space to SOEs (see section 1.4).
On subsidies, Jose Marques, a senior economist at the
World Bank, states that "it is crucial that during the period of
adjustment, the GOES keeps or expands its social programs
directed towards the poor. This can be achieved by an increase
in the recovering costs on the ones which possess more income,
privatizing social services, eliminating general subsidies that
generally benefit more those who do not need them." [Marques:
iii].
If the Feria Internacional de El Salvador (FIES) (see case
4.2), for example, had to pay rent on the open market it would
cost 19,600,000 colones yearly, assuming an average rent of 40
colones a month per square meter, for similar space in a
comparable location. Considering the fact that the FIES shows
a balance of only 300,000 colones every two years, under this
scenario its functions would become unsustainable and it would
have to close. In this case, maintaining the subsidies prevents
real asset value from being considered by maintaining an ongoing
use that would be impossible under normal business practices.
According to Max Figueroa, General Manager of the FIES, there
are similar events of this type run by the private sector in
countries such as Colombia or Germany, for example, which have
proven efficient and are not subsidized [Figueroa].
Free subsidies in the form of land or facilities given to
SOEs that offer services for sale or lease to third parties
benefit very limited groups as seen in the case of the FIES.
Subsidized space implies inefficiency in the use and
allocation of space resources, along with distortion of real
estate market prices, and highest and best possible use. Free
allocation of resources by market forces is prevented because
the private sector and/or the community limited access to
available land.
The question of subsidies, relates to under-utilization.
At one time the departments at MIT, were not accounted for the
space they used. Space was wasted or used in excess to
departmental need. Some departments were justyfing unnecessary
functions in order to keep some space [Kreon Cyrus].
The fact that SOEs can operate only because of space
subsidies leads to a distortion which should be eliminated (see
section 1.4). Even when subsidies are deemed necessary, they
should be evaluated, since they provide a benchmark of
opportunities foregone. The FIES, for example, uses its space
once every two years for a period of 17 days. In the FIES as
well as in other non core SOEs, the size of director's offices
occupy more than 300 square meters. If the enterprise rented a
space of this size in the open market it would pay 288,000
colones for each office yearly (80 colones per squere meter
monthly). This represents income foregone because it cannot
rent this same space to third parties. This situation contrasts
with some government offices where employees are given 3 square
meters.
Subsidies for space in noncore government SOEs contrasts
with the high rents that some critical government institutions
pay for their office space. The Ministerio de Hacienda, for
example, occupied some of FIES installations after its
facilities were destroyed by the earthquake in 1986. However,
the institution was forced to leave in 1990, and now rents
expensive office space.
The Hotel Presidente (see case 4.2) management does not pay
the government for its space, and yet still carries losses. This
has lessened pressures for good management and produced lost
opportunities as a result. The hotel is said to not produce
losses. In reality there is a high under-utilization and
practices such as not charging government institutions or
officials for the use of the facilities are common. This was
not the case when the Hyatt Regency operated the hotel.
Subsidies are also an issue in the PESPP program. It is
the PESPP's policy to sell land at market value. However, PESPP
does not currently recognize the real asset value of land that
is transferred. Under the scenario shown in
Appendix 5.1 assumptions, most of this program will have to be
subsidized. As a result if the PESPP expected quota ceiling is
maintained most urban land disposition will be highly
subsidized. This subsidy may come as a result of the
consideration of the end-user's low-income economic situation.
However, the land's real asset value is not considered, nor is
its highest and best use. In cases where the land is located in
prime development areas its transference may benefit a limited
number of families, as opposed if the land was sold at a price
determined by its real asset value price, and revenues would
spread among more families. The fact that the PESPP transactions
will have to be subsidized is acknowledged by a publication
which analyzes the GOES's housing program '. In the PESPP
program the real asset value of the land is not recognized for
technical and political reasons. This is significant because the
program has high priority over other programs (see section 5.4).
5.43 The value in use vs value in exchange tradeoff.
The current GOES privatization program does not evaluate
the tradeoff of the use value and. exchange value of real
property. This leads to a distortion in the evaluation of
potential opportunities. In the SOEs analyzed in the case
studies, the use value is way bellow value in exchange as
observed in the case 4.2. This residual approximates the
opportunity cost. The lack of consideration prevents the
consideration of the real asset value and the highest and best
use of real property.
5.44 Investment for Physical rehabilitation and Potential
for Alternative Uses.
The core and non-core SOEs in El Salvador need
rehabilitation. The core SOE's that require rehabilitation for
future privatization includes: railroads, airports, ports,
utilities, post- and tele-communications, and government
industrial installations (such as the free trade zones). However
no attempt by the government has yet been done to privatize some
of these SOE's/facilities's real property assets such as
warehouses, terminals, or air rights which might offer potential
for other uses. Some examples follow:
a. The Comalapa International Airport in El Salvador
would be very desirable to privatize from the government's
standpoint. However, the potential impact is high and the
opposition strong. Nevertheless, real property surrounding the
installations could be leased for development of warehouse
facilities or light industry. Also warehouses now used by the
airlines could be leased.
b. The Comision Ejecutiva Portuaria Autonoma (CEPA)
public entity in charge of handling the port of Acajutla has
property surrounding the port that has added value. However,
there is no real compensation for the appreciation. The
government would benefit from leasing the land. In this case
efforts have been made to create a joint venture with the
private enterprise unsuccessfully (see also section 5.4).
c. San Bartolo, a free trade zone, has been targeted by
the government for privatization as an ongoing use
unsuccessfully. However, the scheme does not consider the real
asset value of San Bartolo's real property. The real property
has potential for alternative uses for the following reasons:
The free trade zone facilities were developed about twenty
years ago in the sugar cane fields close to the old
Ilopango International Airport. The closing of the airport
in 1976 to be used exclusively for military purposes
affected the prospects of attracting investment to San
Bartolo.
The free-trade zone is now surrounded by Soyapango, a
rapidly growing urban center of the AMSS which has
increased its population from 100,000 to 500,000 in seven
years. This growth has created demand for other uses in the
area. The space, while still interesting for productive
facilities, might have reached the point of having
potential for other uses, such as supermarkets and
shopping centers. The private enterprise has been
developing warehouses and factory space in the area to
house other functions, such as shopping centers.
Six new free-trade zones are being developed in various
parts of the country. These sites will offer alternative
sites at lower rent, close to the ports and the Comalapa
International Airport.
Most non-core GOES's SOE's are not ready for inmediate
privatization because of their poor physical condition. The
GOES, regardless of its financial constraints, has been
rehabilitating these enterprises. These investments have not
proven cost-effective and may never be fully realized. Many
physical rehabilitations have been done on properties with
potential for alternative uses. Such investments raise the
government's expectations, both on a high potential price and to
keep the SOEs current use. This precludes considering
alternative uses for the real property. Potential investors
may have very different views on how to rehabilitate and/or
change uses of the real property occupied by the SOEs.
Consequently, they may not be willing to pay according to the
GOES price expectations making it difficult to close
transactions. An costly physical rehabilitation of the Hotel
Presidente, for example, for which figures could not be obtained
was done by the government. However prospects for the hotel
being sold are weak. The rehabilitations have been made based on
an expectation to increase the SOEs attractivness to potential
investors, so that the government could not be criticized for
disposing national assets at low prices.
5.5 SOE's REAL PROPERTY EVALUATION
Based on the results of Chapter 4, the current privatization
program has not included for those SOEs and/or institutions
that have the following characteristics: their real property is
underutilized, subsidized, undervalued, and/or surplus to the
SOE's needs; the real property has a potential for a higher and
better use than the current one; the real property
characteristics might enhance the real asset value of other
privatization candidates; and the real property is given non-
intensive-use in prime development areas and/or it is
incompatible with uses in the surrounding areas (see chapter 4
for further information). The current privatization scheme lack
of consideration to the principles proposed in the guidelines
prevents the achievement of real -asset value and highest and
best use of the real property held by SOE's and public
institutions.
5.6 DETERMINE THE PRIVATIZATION METHOD.
The determination of future ownership depends on government
objectives and market conditions. The GOES privatization
program is unclear about the implications of the methods chosen.
Raising revenues, for example, is one objective of the GOES
privatization program. However, the GOES's exclusive selection
of a privatization method for issuing and selling shares,
determined by external pressures, prevents the achievement of
such an objective. The GOES has limited in effect the
privatization program, by precluding the possibility of
liquidating obsolete government functions, closing or selling
obsolete SOEs, and selling or leasing their underutilized
assets. Consequently, preventing the consideration of the real
asset value in those cases where the real property held by the
SOEs/entities with potential alternative uses.
In Chapter 4, various institutions were analyzed for their
potential alternative real property uses as opposed to current
usage. If privatized as ongoing uses, these SOEs will not fully
realize the real asset value.
Privatization methods such as leasing, joint ventures, or
the participation of the private enterprise in the
rehabilitation of SOEs have been tried unsuccessfully in the
past. The effort to create a joint venture with a private firm
to develop a free-trade zone which would utilize publicly-held
vacant land owned by CEPA in the Acajutla port failed because of
the unattractive interest rates 2.
The transference of real property assets to the private
sector by means of divestiture is part of a privatization
program, but is also a main activity in management of the real
property portfolio. The GOES gives to privatization and
divestment a high priority. These two options, however, just
two among the possible asset management techniques that the
government could use in order to manage the real property
portfolio in a coordinated fashion. The techniques include
acquisition, leasing, space use-intensification, relocation and
reshuffling of resources from one institution to another or
within the same institution.
The lack of consideration of other alternatives besides
privatization or divestiture prevents evaluating the
aforementioned techniques as part of a combination of
alternatives. In the Feria Internacional (see case 4.2), for
example, the real property could be partially privatized, and
the current facilities given intensified uses while gradually
developing the rest of the property to mixed uses. Otherwise,
the excessive emphasis to privatization or divestiture prevents
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the consideration of real asset value of real property which has
potential for mixed alternatives that could gradually increase
this value.
5.7 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM
Two contradictory institutional schemes exist for the
privatization process, and both have political support (see
section 3.2) The first, a loose decentralized scheme, considers
that each SOE is thought to be capable of starting its own
privatization process, and it presupposes that they know how to
proceed. The point is to prevent the formation of a
privatization "Tzar" [Zablah, Minister of Economy] . This
approach contradicts the successful privatization practices in
other countries in which the evaluation of privatization
candidates has been made by independent parties and an
independent organization has coordinated the process.
The second, the Privatization Commission scheme, is
unlikely to be promptly implemented. The commission has the
support of USAID, but there is insufficient interest within the
government constitutencies to give it enough power, at least in
the short term. The commission has been under attack from
within the government since its inception. A minister, refering
to the commission states "there are 17 barons who would not let
anyone take power which makes the process of decision making
really hard." A high-ranking officer of the Commission
acknowledges that the commission is under attack: "There seems
to be interest in wanting us to look bad before the government
and the USAID". Added to this, the Commission does not seem
ready to be given full power, nor does it have a privatization
plan. The limited resources of information in real property
inventories have not yet reached the commission.
In view of the above, the loose decentralized will prevail
for the short term, since the privatization commission might not
be operational soon. Under this scheme, each SOE is expected to
start its own privatization process independently as mentioned.
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The other privatization-related alternatives, such as the PESPP
and the divestiture of land, are not coordinated with the
privatization commission. Therefore the privatization
initiatives are based on the proposals of the interested
ministries, and not on a concerted effort. This creates the
following problems:
a. Privatization initiatives are evaluated in isolation
in this scheme. The scheme therefore fails to detect
opportunities for joint analysis of privatization candidates,
such as the FIES and la Lechuza which belong to different
ministries, based on their real property characteristics such as
complementarity. This consequently prevents the recognition
and/or maximization of their real asset value as the evidence in
case study 4.2 shows.
b. The interests of sectoral parties may prevail over
the GOES objectives. This affects the evaluation of alternative
uses of the real property held by SOE's, because inside parties
tend to retain current usage as explained in section 5.2. This
was evaluated in the ISIC case study (see case study 41). In
the case of SOEs such as the FIES, La Lechuza, or Hotel
Presidente, if privatized with efforts that come from the entity
itself, they would be kept in their current use. The case of
the military installations mentioned in section 5.2 provides
another example of sectoral objectives prevailing over the
government objectives.
c. The decision-making process for privatization of the
GOES is reactive, responding to political presssures rather than
technical arguments, and therefore ignoring sound asset
management practices. This is a result of the loose and
uncoordinated decision-making process worsened by the haste of
the PESPP program, which contrasts with the slowness of the
privatization program. - The combination of the aforementioned
situations does not create a good environment for decision-
making, especially in the absence of a global vision,
coordination among different initiatives and mechanisms for real
property management. Consequently the PESSP program tends to
prevail.
d. Sectoral interests of different groups, programs, or
government institutions may prevail over the overall interest of
the government. For example, a program which is receiving more
attention at a particular moment might take precedence over
other equally important programs. Therefore the decision-making
process is done based on the need to satisfy the sectoral
objectives of a particular initiative rather than to satisfy
higher-level objectives such as better use of resources. Some
examples are:
. In the current privatization decision-making there is no
mechanism to decide priorities for particular pieces of
land. Two or more initatives may be studying the
feasibility of privatization of the same lot of land.
Given the lack of coordination the initiative that first
identifies a use for the land, regardless of the its
highest and best use, would privatize the property. This
ignores the real asset value. A lot of land located in
Santa Ana, for example, which was first designated by the
PESPP program for a housing project, was then also proposed
by another initiative to be leased for the development of
a free trade zone. Because the PESPP initiative identified
the property first, the lot was assigned to this initiative
regardless of the fact that the highest and best use of the
land is in the latter alternative.
There is conflict of interest within institutions.
CORSAIN, for example, was until 1990 the body in charge of
privatization, but lately also distributes land to the
PESPP program as one of its functions. The haste of the
PESPP program creates pressure to assign properties to the
housing program, which prevents properties being given to
other productive activities. Given the short span of time
and the lack of accurate inventories, this could mean
giving away non-registered government owned land e.g. the
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PESPP program will grant title to the those living on the
10 hectares of land in the El Manguito community. This
land has not had a registered owner for many years.
However it might be part of a property the government
bought in the 1940's as part of the El Salvador Country
Club.
5.7 REAL PROPERTY INVENTORY AND MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE.
Having access to systematic knowledge about current real
property holdings is a necessary condition for large
organizations in order to maximize real asset value. The current
privatization process takes place within a pattern of widespread
mismanagement of the GOES's RPP which includes the lack of
accurate inventories. This creates technical and political
barriers to the consideration of real asset value in the near
future.
The lack of both a real property management tradition and
theoretical knowledge creates no incentives to achieve the real
property highest and best use. For example, there is no
incentive to recognize the opportunity cost of holding real
property or subsidizing free space to SOEs, as examined in
section 5.32
Estimations of the real property inventory have been
historically based on the reports of the "Direcci6n de
Contabilidad Central" (DCC), the entity in charge of the
valuation of real property assets in the national budget. The
figures of the DCC inventory shown in appendix 5B provide an
extremely undervalued picture of the GOES's RPP, as compared to
the inventory presented in Chapter 3. The insufficient and
under-valued data of the DCC inventory hide the exchange value
of most properties and do not permit the evaluation of their
restrictions and possibilities. Given the fact that no
inventories were available in the past, the DCC inventory,
despite its innacuracies, has been the basis for research
studies in the determination of policies in real property.
The lack of both accurate inventories of real property and
a real property management tradition, mentioned above, are
important to understanding why real property has been ignored by
researchers working on the structural problems of El Salvador's
economy in general, and on the size of its public sector in
particular. For example, major research studies such as
Harberger and Wisecarver, which were the basis for the policies
of the new government, overlooked the implications of an idle
RPP and recommended that no actions should be taken to reduce
fixed assets (see section 5.1). As a result, the GOES's five
year plan mentioned nothing about the planning and management of
its real property resources. The idle RPP was regarded as a
vital part neither of the GOES restructuring program nor of the
privatization objectives.
The RPP potential has finally been accounted for, because
of the results of the new inventory. Since the inventory
started producing results there have been leaks of information
e.g the National Assembly asking for partial results. This was
the reason for many of the pressures mentioned above.
Despite the importance of the new inventory stated in
Chapter 3, it is unlikely that this might be an accurate tool
for privatization decision-making in the near future. This is
especially true with regard to the real asset value and
determination of the highest and best use. This conclusion is
based on technical and political considerations such as the
following:
5.71 Technical considerations:
a. The lack of a centralized system of real property
information results in a lack of a global perspective.
Privatization involves, by necessity, several government
constituencies which must have access to information. A
centralized system could be accessed by the different
privatization programs and constituencies involved in
determining the use of the public sector real property.
b. The information on real property is held in different
institutions with uncoordinated functions and obsolete methods
of gathering information. Real property legal status, value, or
even existence is not accounted for in these institutions'
accounting departments. The Direccion de Contabilidad Central
(DCC) , for example, is supposed to provide accurate, up-to-date
inventories. However, many government properties are simply
not in its books as a result of problems of logistics and
discipline.
c. Attempts at changing the real property management
structure are limited by the lack of organizational capability
or technical expertise in managing real property.
d. The VMV inventory has focused on the PESPP program
exclusively. This inventory sectoral focus, added to its
innacurate information, produces the following problems:
Failure to provide complete real property information which
would be helpful for strategic decision making in
privatization. The current inventory has an exclusive
emphasis on vacant land. This means that all other
information, such as buildings and land in use, which has
also been gathered, might be lost in the process.
. Biased information, which does not help privatization or
other real property management decision-making processes.
Therefore, properties which have potential uses other than
housing may end up being given away to housing projects
because of this current inventory focus.
. The lack of transparency of information. No specific
details about each property are presented because it might
not appear politically convenient to show that a GOES
institution owns completely unused properties such as a
large villa in Coatepeque Lake.
e. There is a lack of a coordinated central initiative on
the valuation of real property components of the inventory.
Each ministry and government institution is expected to make the
valuation of their own properties 3. The argument for each
institution updating the data on "their" real property is that
each institution is expected to arrange its own house. Each
division will take care of updating the real property data, and
this information will be tranferred to the DCC. This scheme is
unlikely to succeed given that: a) institutions lack the
necessary technical or human resources, and land registration
procedures are obsolete; and b) people use property that does
not belong to them, and there are plenty of overlaps and
undefined borders among properties.
Most likely then, there will be no update of the
information or it will be very poor. The process will not
verify the market value information property by property. The
VNV was planning field research on each property but under the
MIPLAN now this idea has been abandoned.
Valuation is an important process in privatization. This
includes valuation at the level of the whole inventory and
valuation in the particular case of each privatization
candidate. Within the latter the current scheme of valuation
presents the problem that privatization criteria for the
valuation of the real property assets have not yet been
developed. In this country the current method of estimation for
valuation purposes according to DGP is based on the estimation
of the replacement cost (as mentioned in chapter 2).
Under the current methods of DGP, the cost of deferred
maintenance is not estimated and the figures only consider
parameters of current costs of a square meter of a similar
type of construction. A factor of depreciation is then
applied. Say the building is 25 years old and the
expected life horizon is 50 years, the building would be
depreciated of its replacement cost 50%. This formula does
not consider the growing physical obsolescence resulting
from deferred maintenance, which depreciates the value much
more.
Space currently used by the SOE might be in excess of the
needs of the new entity. However, no post-occupancy
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evaluation has been executed. Further assessment of both
the post-occupancy-evaluation and replacement cost
methodologies are beyond the scope of this document.
. The current method of valuation, replacement cost, should
not be considered in the estimation of an institution/SOE's
worth to the GOES. The GOES does not replace the facility,
so this should be instead the concern of the new entity.
What is important from the GOES's standpoint is the NPV of
an SOE's current income, which could be compared with the
opportunity cost of those facilities, determined by the
market value (as explained in chapter 2).
Most government officials agree that there should be an
institution to maintain a central inventory. This is the case
of the Ministry of Hacienda. Unfortunately, this institution
has demonstrated strong resistance to changing the current
procedures for real property management.
5.72 Political considerations:
a. The current narrow focus of some GOES officials for
whom the gathering of a real property inventory is the last step
in the management of the public sector assets. GOES officials,
because of their lack of background information on real estate
management, do not have an understanding of real property
importance in relation to government policies. GOES officials
adhere to traditional methods of accounting.
b. The project has not interested GOES institutions.
Therefore, it lacks importance at the strategic Consejo de
Ministros level where the purpose of this information is not
well understood. The lack of political support results in the
poor deployment of resources for the inventory. This has
resulted in a slow process characterized by lack of access to
hardware and people (see appendix 5.B for details) and by the
lack of prompt reports of the institutions concerned. As of
June 1991 the inventory had already taken two years and it is
far from completition. Institutions took very long to respond
and most did so wrongly or based on incorrect ideas of what is
their property.
C. The gathering of information has occurred under two
ministries. There has been repetition of activities and data in
the VMV inventory has not been taken into account in the MIPLAN
inventory, e.g. the legal status of the property.
d. The inventory is most important under the current "El
Salvador Pais de Propietarios" program given that there will be
an inmediate process of legalization of real property. In some
cases the own government may not acknowledge ownership and will
give away land that belongs to the nation as a whole. This is
most problematic for the government, because there are at least
3000 properties in the hands of the State. Most of them have
not been valued, and in some cases their existence has not even
been acknowledged.
The inventory information should be aimed at identyfing
also real property which has potential for divestment. It is
unlikely that given the lack of real political support and
understanding, the inventory efforts will achieve satisfactory
results or be the base for sucessful uses. This prevents the
real property held by SOEs achieving the real asset value.
SUMMARY.
Given the technical and political obstacles discussed here,
it appears unlikely that the privatization effort will be able
to recognize either the real asset value or the highest and best
use of the assets which are candidates for privatization. In
summary there is need for an accurate inventory as the first key
step to the establishment of sound asset management practice.
The current institutional structure in the management of RPP
does not allow for sound asset management practices to take
place in the privatization process.
The current pressure for the distribution of land by the
government to the housing programs, the haste of the PESPP
program, and the slowness of other programs, may, in the
absence of a real asset management policy, prevent the
consideration of the real asset value, and the achievement of
highest and best use of real property.
Government decision-makers and researchers underestimate or
ignore the real property portfolio's importance as a most
sizable and valuable but wasted resource. The lack of accurate
inventories hides the idle real property potential. This has
affected research studies and has resulted in the lack of
political committment to the consideration of the real asset
value. As proposed in Chapter 1, this thesis considers the
cost of subsidies in the form of free space to SOE's, and the
evaluation of the opportunity cost of holding real property
occupied by SOEs.
NOTES OF THE CHAPTER.
1 This publication states that "Even though the State may
subsidize families on the acquisition of housing, this would not
resolve the problems of more than half a million families in
extreme poverty. In any case, the privatization would mean a
high acquisition value, that even though there is a subsidiary
component is not reduced effectively" [Fundabal, 1.
2 The rate of 19% is unatractive in relation to other
countries in the area which subsidize the interest rate in the
development of free trade zones.
3 There is a pilot plan project to create the divisions for
gathering the inventory in the following five ministries:
Public Works, Health, Education, Economy and Agriculture.
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
This document concludes that for political and technical
reasons the process of privatization of the Government of El
Salvador is unlikely to occur in the near future, in ways that
would recognize the real asset value or the highest and best use
of the real property held by public institutions and state owned
enterprises. However, evidence from an isolated case shows that
taking into account real asset management practices might
succeed in some cases in the current privatization process.
There are windows of opportunity for governments looking at
their real assets in a new manner; they could provide an
alternative source of potential candidates that could be
privatized successfully at low cost and high benefit for
society.
This study showed the need for a privatization evaluation
that takes into account real asset management practices.
Privatization and divestment are just two among the possible
asset management instances that the government could use in
order to manage the RPP according to sound asset management
practices.
Current processes of privatization for the following
technical and political reasons neither consider the real asset
value nor achieve the highest and best use for the real property
held by the SOEs:
1. The privatization experience worldwide does consider
real property in only an incidental manner. No examples were
found to document changes of uses in the real property of the
SOE's, nor of SOE's identified as potential candidates for
privatization because of their potential highest and best use as
oppossed to their current use. This thesis concludes that real
property, from a strategic and tactical standpoint, is not
regarded as an important consideration in current privatization
of SOE's analysis.
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2. The current GOES privatization scheme has not
accounted for various SOEs or institutions that have become
uncalled for as a result of redefined government objectives and
have the following characteristics: the space is underutilized,
subsidized, undervalued, and/or surplus to the SOE's needs; the
space has a potential for a higher and better use than the
current one; the real property characteristics might enhance the
real asset value of other privatization candidates; and the real
property is given non-intensive-use in prime development areas
and/or it is incompatible with uses in the surrounding areas.
3. The current institutional structure in the management
of RPP does not allow sound asset management practices to take
place in the privatization process:
a. There is lack of a global vision and coordination among
different initiatives; therefore the PESSP tends to
prevail. The program of land disposal for income and the
privatization of SOEs have this in common. This occurs in
the absence of a real property management mechanism.
b. A program which has recieved more attention at a particular
moment might take the initiative over other programs which
might be equally important.
c. GOES privatization decision-making is reactive and not
proactive --responding to political pressures rather than
to technical arguments, and therefore ignoring sound asset
management practices.
4. The GOES privatization process takes place within a
context of widespread mismanagement of its RPP characterized by:
a. Lack of accurate inventories on real property holdings
hides the idle real property potential, and prevents the
achievement of its real asset value. It makes research
studies difficult; it precludes political committment to
the consideration of real asset value. The sectoral
orientation of the current inventory restrains its
application to the privatization. The lack of a centralized
system of real property information produces a lack of a
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global perspective on how to manage real property to
achieve its real asset value.
b. A lack of research and understanding of real property
management theory and inadequate accounting practices hide
or distort the opportunity cost of holding an idle RPP.
This results in Government decision-makers and researchers
underestimating or ignoring RPP as a most sizeable and
valuable, but often wasted resource.
c. The current process lacks the incentives to account for the
opportunity cost of holding real property or subsidizing
free space to SOEs. The implications in terms of
opportunities foregone to society and for the country are
enormous:
. The opportunities foregone from holding under-utilized
assets, at a time when the first priority should be the
execution of socially desirable projects and the
rehabilitation of the deteriorated public sector
infrastructure.
. The competition for scarce government resources
produces land scarceness in the face of increasing
pressures on the public sector's RPP from both the real
estate developers and squatters.
. The inefficiency produced by space subsidies to SOE's
creating under-utilization and distorting the evaluation of
SOE's productivity levels.
. The need to create alternative ways to generate income
to the public sector in order to offset some of the
negative effects of the PAE as opposed to the exclusive
emphasis on tributary approaches.
d. It affects the privatization and divestment strategies
and/or creates barriers to the identification and
evaluation of potential candidates.
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RECOMMENDATIONS:
From a personal view the following recommendations are
proposed to refocus the current privatization program based on
the following rationale:
1. There is a need for mechanisms that create the
perception of the urgent need to generate a political process to
rationalize the planning and efficient use of the public real
property assets. A revision of the following practices is
recommended: The opportunity cost of holding real property and
the subsidies to space. The analysis of the needs for space in
the SOE's should be driven by considering space necessities as
in the open market like any other private enterprise, not
subsidized by the state.
2. The proposed scheme must revise the methods of real
property evaluation of privatization candidates to consider the
possibility of alternative uses for its real property resources
and their possibilities for relocation. This would replace the
current scheme, which is based on the exclusive consideration of
real property's ongoing use. This prevents achieving the real
property's highest and best use. The analysis of creative and
profitable solutions, such as market modifications or joint
developments with adjacent properties to take advantage of the
ever-changing real estate conditions is encouraged.
3. Management action on these forms of use of real
property is necessary because of the following:
a. The GOES objectives should prevail over the sectoral
objectives of all parties involved.
b. Research in the field must give more importance to the
evaluation of the privatization candidates from a real
property standpoint.
4. The creation of an inventory would help as a decision-
making tool in order to identify real property occupied by GOES
institutions or SOE's, its restrictions, and its opportunities.
Given the urgency of privatization and divestment, this
inventory is needed for practical reasons in the short-term. It
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is, therefore, most important to intensify current efforts in
the generation of the VMV inventory to transform its sectoral
focus and update information such as market values. The
following actions are suggested:
. Give attention to legal status. Otherwise this will result
in costly mistakes, as in the ISIC privatization, or lack
of identification of potential opportunities for real
property.
. Update inventories accurately and include information which
is relevant to privatization evaluation such as a portfolio
list of potential candidates.
Consulting groups should consider the potential importance
of real property case by case and not rely on distorted
accounting figures.
5. At this point, it is important to suggest that
the privatization/divestment effort proposed by this document be
an integral part of an overall approach to the planning and
management of the GOES's RPP. Therefore, a merging of the
separated focus of privatization and divestment processes into
a joint vision which unifies these processes is suggested. In
the context of the GOES, this could be achieved by means of the
creation of a real property centralized think tank which
connects under a common umbrella the management of the RPP and
all the current isolated GOES initiatives. Having a central
decision-making body that would evaluate whether real property
assets should be privatized, divested, acquired or donated to
social programs would benefit the GOES in the following ways:
Coordinating the decision making process which controls and
plans the use of public sector real property.
Keeping a global perspective and interest as opposed to
sectoral interests.
Centralizing expertise in the area, helping to create an
efficient decision-making process.
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. Determining potential opportunities if the real estate
committee participates in the Government's full planning
cycle.
. Monitoring real estate matters, avoiding deviation of the
attention of the GOES from its primary line of activities.
. Overseeing government interests over the sectoral interests
- ministries, institutions, or particular groups - to
achieve the highest and best use of resources, rather than
keeping them in their current use.
Some recommendations for the privatization effort
institutional structure are:
. To include in the privatization research teams, a member
with a real property management experience, to evaluate
potential strategies.
. To redefine existing methodologies to include the
possibilities of analyzing real property concerns.
The establishment of a real property strategy within the
public sector connected to the GOES current privatization
initiative. This would centralize decision-making and make
candidate selection and evaluation more efficient. This
should eliminate bureaucratization and coordinate the
different real estate activities of the different
government institutions.
To generate the political process to give these
considerations priority among the privatization program.
An understanding of the aforementioned factors is fundamental to
influencing decision-making policy, which should emphasize the
importance of changing both conceptions and practices rooted in
the system, to produce efficient management of real property.
This must include the creation of the mechanisms necessary to
implement the policies of divestiture decided upon. Without
political determination, and understanding of the importance of
physical factors within development management and planning, the
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above recommendations would neither gain priority nor be
successful. This study stresses the importance of using publicly
held real property in the best possible way, to make it work for
the state and the community.
This thesis has covered new ground and is quite broad in
scope. Few sources could be found to treat the topic directly
from the proposed standpoint. Thus, there was a need to
assemble a bit of theoretical and practical information, and to
delineate the domain. For this reason, the topics have not all
been treated at the same level of detail. Emphasis was given to
the different institutional perceptions about real property.
This work is considered to be a first effort in the long-term
goal of supporting El Salvador's government in the development
of policies and strategies for the transference of its services
or assets to the private sector. Substantial effort went into
the gathering of isolated bits of information to generate the
case studies. The many loose ends might serve as further topics
for research in their own right. Their coming together in this
thesis could serve as benchmarks for future work.
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building was built having in mind a public institution client,
with the arrival of the new government the transaction stopped
since the potential acquisitor was a first candidate for
privatization and it was an expensive building in those
particular circumstances. The building is running under an
excessively accelerated process of obsolescence because both,
its lack of utilization and the continuous attacks to the
building with damages that had not been repaired. Military corps
are installed in the top floors, because of the building
strategic position.
El Espino hacienda
It has an area of 996 Ha, or its equivalent of 12,000,000 V2 is
now worth between 250 and 300 colones a Vr2, therefore it has a
market value of 3000,000,000 colones. The land was declared at
book value at 50 cents a Vr2 when confiscated from its owners by
the Agrarian reform intervention in 1981. Some of this rural
land intervened was held in pockets within major areas of urban
development.
Current status: The land legally belongs to ISTA, and is used as
a cooperative manner as a coffee farm. This land is under
intense debate about what to do with it. Last year, after a
long legal process, started by the former owners, the court
declared it the property should be given back to them. A public
debate started, agricultural communities beneficiaries of the
agrarian reform outraged, and began a campaign of public
pressure (even threats). This motivated the intervention of the
Minister of Agriculture in order to look for an alternative
agreement in which the beneficiaries kept part of the property
or the benefits of its sale, a major part was given back to its
former owners and around 90 Ha were kept as a reserve land for
park. This land is of utmost potential for the AMSS urban
development because of being located in between densely
populated areas.
Museo Nacional David. J Guzman.
Represents an amenity in the area, it uses a plot of land owned
by the ministry of Public Works.
10) Ministry of Foreign Relations.
Old facilities of El Salvador Country Club. The facilities of
this ministry have a surrounding land that is not utilized which
is excessive to the institutional needs and necessary from the
standpoint of government image exclusively. This land could
evaluated in the future as a park, scarce in San Salvador
nowadays.
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APPENDIXES
APPENDIX 4
State Owned Enterprises/entities in the area.
Military School and Estado Mayor.
These facilities had been long planned to be relocated to the
area of El Espino {5}. As mentioned before, given the present
situation they represent a potential serious threat against the
security of surrounding neighborhoods and interfere the normal
circulation of traffic in one of the main streets of the city.
It has been a long desired goal of the GOES to relocate all
military facilities out of the city but a discussion of the
future of these military installation had always been a tabu
specially in these recent years.
a) The military installations which as a result of the 11 year
old conflict, have been the strategic targets of various
attacks from active guerrilla groups, with the following
negative effects:
b.1 Damages to surrounding facilities such as a gas
station, a medical clinic, restaurants, private
residencies. This attacks have produced various
casualties and dozens of civilians injured.
b.2 The continual closing of the Manuel Enrique Araujo
Alameda since three years (see map). This is the main
artery between San Salvador and Nueva San Salvador.
b.3 Reduction or failure of investment in some surrounding
areas. For example, 80 percent of the nearby shopping
mall, "Feria Rosa", has not been even been occupied
yet.
6) Presidente Theater and parking space.
Designed for 1200 spectators. The theater is running into a fast
obsolescence, the cinema facilities are hardly used and the
parking space is highly under-utilized except for sporadic
events. Current status: the theater and facilities
are under increased pressure to be donated to the Direccion de
Artes.
7)_ Torre Democracia.
A 20 floor building with 10000 m2 of built space valued at
60,000,000 colones. It was overtaken by the Nationalized Bank
System, as result of the developers' failure to sell the
building on the market. Its costs were a little lower than those
of similar public buildings, however, its potential operational
cost would be enormous since the building has to operate
completely with air conditioning.
Current status: The building needs to be divested by the bank
the bottom price estimated for sale is 80,000,000 colones. This
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APPENDIX 5 A
Assume that the typical plot size in an urban area is 75 square
meters or less. The beneficiaries of this program would pay an
approximate quota of 40 to 60 colones monthly (7.5 dollars), as
defined as the ceiling by the VMV. This figure is based in the
amount that persons of low income (around 500 colones monthly)
would be able to afford. Under the current 15% inflation and
interest rates of 21%, this would mean that in a period of 15
years an individual would end up paying 4500 colones NPV (563
dollars NPV). This sum by the area of the typical plot would
provide the ceiling to the price of land which could be
available. This ceiling is around 60 colones V2. Since prices,
at least in the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador (AMSS), are
above this range (the price of land in the city ranges from 150
colones up to 1000 colones-- 18 dollars to 130 dollars) per V2.
If the ceiling is maintained most publicly held land disposed of
in urban areas require to be subsidy.
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APPENDIX 5B
The Inventory of DCC shows a value for the portfolio of 453
million colones plus buildings in the process of construction
valued at 843 millions. Adding a total of 1296 million colones
for the total real property portfolio. This patrimony item is
segregated from the national budget.
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TABLE 5.1(Source information gathered at the DCC reports from
1972-1988, for methodology see, the diferentE data was put into
table)
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ANNEX 6. 1
FIELD WORK
Interviews with the next persons:
Dr. Ardito Harberger, economic consultant for the GOES.
Ing. Mauricio Stubig Minister of Public Works, El Salvador
Arq. Roberto Paredes, Vice Minister of Housing.
Lic. Ernesto Altschul, Vice Minister of Planning.
Dr. Pedro Arriagada, Executive Director of DEES , FUSADES
Lic. Hector Vidal, Head of DEES, Privatization Comission.
Arq. Gabriel Riesco, OAS delegate, Ministery of Planning.
Lic. Jose Marques, World Bank, Consultant for FUSADES
Arq. Leon Sol, OPAMSS
Lic. Mario Radelli, President of CORSAIN.
Lic. Jos6 Angel Quiroz, ViceMinister of Hacienda.
Lic. Manuel Alvarado Cano, Minister of Hacienda.
Mr. Sanabria, Director of the National Budget Direction.
Mr. Oscar Novoa, director of the Central Accounting Direction.
Ing. James Stephenson, USAID, private sector.
* The National Budget Direction, that executes the valuations
of all the real property assets, the government owns,
leases or of the potential candidates. It values market
conditions.
* The Central Accounting Direction, is the institution part
of the Ministery of Hacienda.
* Fundacion Salvadorena de Desarrollo
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